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ABSTRACT 
Empirical research on U.S. foreign policy has largely assumed that the president’s 
influence is subordinate to global and domestic political constraints.  This idea is given further 
weight by the fact that, even within the political psychology literature, there is scant large-n, 
quantitative evidence supporting the notion that leaders matter.  This study is an attempt to 
explore the influence of U.S. presidential psychological characteristics on foreign policy actions 
through assessment of two operational code constructs: “image of the political universe” (P-1), 
and “strategic preferences” (I-1).  This is assessed through an extensive sample of operational 
code beliefs for every president from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush.  The dependent 
variable of policy actions is measured with event data.  Findings show that previous actions by 
the U.S. toward the Middle East, previous actions by Middle Eastern states toward the U.S., and 
the president’s perceived image of the political universe are significantly related to foreign 
policy outcomes.  This supports the policy continuity argument that pre-existing policies 
influence U.S. policies in the present, the policy reciprocation/escalation argument that the U.S. 
is influenced by what other states do, and the psychological argument that elites influence 
outcomes based on their personal belief systems.
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INTRODUCTION 
Of critical interest in the analysis of American foreign policy is the influence of the 
president.  Fred Greenstein (2002) notes that following the Depression, World War II, and the 
associated precedents set by Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. presidents gained an unparalleled level 
of influence over U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the security domain.  The president plays an 
exceptional role, acting in both a substantive and symbolic sense as the chief figurehead, 
diplomat, and decision-maker in foreign affairs.  This stems both from constitutionally mandated 
authority and his unparalleled level of visibility and influence (McCormick, 2005).  As such, it is 
not surprising that the president is unambiguously viewed as the most powerful individual in the 
world, often being attributed both the credit and blame for what happens during, and often 
following, his watch as Commander-in-Chief. 
 However, in opposition to Greenstein’s claim, Neustadt (1990) states that “most of the 
time, [the president] is supposed to be weak.  And in the normal course, getting what he wants is 
supposed to be hard” (p.xvii).  In this framework, the president is not an autonomous decision-
maker in U.S. politics.  Though Greenstein is correct in that the president, technically, can 
exercise a great deal of power, the ability to wield this power when and how a president sees fit 
may not be self-evident once existing Congressional, public, bureaucratic, and global constraints 
are taken into account (McCormick, 2005).  These “checks and balances” clearly constrain the 
U.S. president’s range of movement, and notwithstanding special circumstances such as the 
occurrence of major national crises right before or during his time in office (Halverson, 
Holladay, Kazama, Quiñones, 2004), a president must typically limit his fights to issues that 
matter the most to him, even in foreign policy, where the president has traditionally held sway 
(Olson, 1976; Marshall, 2003). 
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A caveat added to Greenstein’s point might then be that if existing political constraints 
and opportunities are well understood by the individual in office, and if these factors are in a 
position to be manipulated, the president is certainly capable of exercising control beyond that of 
any other individual in the world (Rothkopf, 2005; Neustadt, 1990; McCormick, 2005).  
Following the above, the broad purpose of this study is to further understand the degree to which 
presidents influence foreign policy outcomes, given a range of both domestic and international 
constraints and opportunities.  More specifically, I attempt to ascertain the degree to which the 
personal preferences and beliefs (in terms of the operational code) of U.S. presidents have 
influenced foreign policy actions in the Middle East in recent years.  This is assessed in a 
systematic, quantitative fashion examining presidential belief systems and corresponding 
international events from 1981 to 2004 (Ronald Reagan through George W. Bush).  Expectations 
are that the president will yield control over outcomes following his beliefs about the nature 
(image) of the political universe and his preferred strategies for dealing with such. 
The Neglect of Presidential Autonomy 
Arguments that minimize the degree of U.S. presidential autonomy on outcomes are 
widespread and fairly well-accepted in the political science literature.  The president must, out of 
necessity, delegate nearly all low-level executive decisions to subordinates (George, 1980).   In 
addition to this, the impetus to survive as a politician, to reward those who have in the past and 
can in the future help the president achieve his goals, to leave behind a favorable legacy, and to 
act in the interests of “the state” above the president’s own, personal well-being are very strong.  
Thus, factors constraining the president in pursuit of foreign policy include levels of public 
backing (Risse-Kappen, 1991; Collier and Sullivan, 1995; Page and Barabas, 2000; Clark, 2001; 
Sobel, 2001; Nincic, 2004) and Congressional support (Olson, 1976; Wittkopf, 1990; Meernik, 
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1993; Wittkopf and McCormick, 1998; Schraufnagel and Shellman, 2001; Marshall, 2003), 
bureaucratic factors (Holland, 1999; De Castro, 2000; Drezner, 2000; Christensen and Bedd, 
2004;), domestic ethnic and business interests (Allison and Halperin, 1972; Lindblom, 1977; 
Mitchell, 1997; Brener, Haney, and Vanderbush, 2004), and international constraints (Waltz, 
1979; Fordham, 2002) to name a few.  In truth, a constellation of these factors act together at a 
given time to influence policy outcomes (Ostrom and Job, 1986), but even this is not the whole 
story.  In attempts to explain exactly who or what affects presidential decisions most strongly, 
these studies overlook certain critically important factors emanating from the president himself.  
The president is not simply an automaton, through which policies are decided based on a 
procedurally rational, cost-benefit analysis solely regarding the interests of “the state.”  Rather, 
presidents, like anyone else, are human beings with ideas, prejudices, motives, and beliefs that 
make decisions based purely on objective reality and external stimuli impossible.  Thus, though 
“structural” factors certainly facilitate and constrain presidential actions, they do not determine 
them.  This is an important point, as the president, an individual with suboptimal decision-
making abilities, must ultimately provide leadership for the most powerful state in the world, and 
set the tone for much of a given administration’s policies, with significant ramifications 
particularly in the world’s political and economic spheres (Neustadt, 1990). 
Though the argument that a strong, independent presidential influence on foreign policy 
exists seems intuitive, and is backed by a wealth of support from qualitative case studies and 
historical analyses (Neustadt, 1990; Beschloss, 1995; Greene, 2000; Bermann, 2001; Mann, 
2004; Moens, 2004), this is still in many ways an empirical question.  Can presidential decision-
making be determined essentially through examination of outside factors, or does presidential 
psychology really tap into something substantively important apart from these other, “structural” 
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concerns?  The nature of studying elite- level political psychology can make answers to these 
questions unsatisfactory to skeptics, who may prefer to let large-n, quantitative studies dictate 
their understand ing of the political world (rather than theories that are overly reliant on 
qualitative and smaller-n empirical support).  Thus, though the use of more in-depth, qualitative 
analyses that examine the psychological characteristics of leaders often provide useful, detailed 
explanations of how psychological factors influence policy decisions, this is unsatisfactory to 
some who see these results (and often political psychology in general) as too idiosyncratic to be 
of real, “scientific” use. 
Relating to the above, though it is commonplace for research focusing on individuals to 
argue for the importance of psychology, this argument is often made without the high levels of 
statistical confidence in findings traditionally found in other areas of political science.  This is 
due, in part, to the general logistical problems of exploring the mind of individuals who can not 
typically be interviewed or tested via traditional psychological methods of clinical analysis.  
Thus, there is a dearth of available tools and data in political psychology work to explore large-
sample, replicable analyses with their associated statistical methodologies.  This study attempts 
to address these concerns by examining psychological explanations in a fairly “rigorous” 
manner, testing the utility of an accepted representation of elite- level psychology (the operational 
code) as an influence on policy outcomes in a large-n, time-series fashion. 
Psychological Factors Affecting Foreign Policy Decision-Making  
Before discussing the details of this study, previous works have suggested that 
presidential psychological characteristics matter in specific domains regarding foreign policy-
making, and these works have helped to lay the groundwork for this study.  One popular area of 
research in this vein explores presidential “leadership style.”  This refers to the “ways in which 
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leaders relate to those around them . . . and how they structure interactions and the norms, rules, 
and principles they use to guide such interactions” (Hermann, 2003, p.181).  These 
characteristics include feelings of control over the environment, the need for power, conceptual 
complexity, self-confidence, problem vs. orientation preferences, level of distrust toward others, 
and the intensity of in-group bias (Hermann, 2003).  Though leadership trait analysis (L.T.A.) 
has been largely concerned with U.S. presidents, it has been shown to matter in other world 
leaders as well (Hermann, 1980, 1984, 1995; Stewart, Hermann, and Hermann, 1989; Kaarbo 
and Hermann, 1998).  Also, typologies have been developed from this that may be useful toward 
simplifying political understanding.  For instance, Hermann (2003) shows that how an 
individual’s constellation of scores match up on a given type of motivation, degree of 
responsiveness to constraints, and degree of openness to information places this individual on a 
typology (for example, as evangelistic vs. expansionistic, or opportunistic vs. collegial-p.185). 
Hermann (1984) also argues that an individual’s degree of interest in foreign policy and 
level of sensitivity to outside events (similar to the “openness to information” and 
“responsiveness to constraints” concepts mentioned above) strongly affects presidential control 
over outcomes.  For example, those highly sensitive to the environment with high levels of 
interest in foreign policy are likely to become over- involved, micro-managing policy decisions.  
Conversely, those low in both categories are likely to rely completely on their own dispositions 
when making policy, irrespective of contextual information (Hermann, 1984, p.77).  These 
personality features thus act as a “filter” through which we can understand decision-making 
processes (Hermann, 1984, p.55). 
Another important individual- level component affecting presidential influence on policy 
action is that of motivation.  Motives are basically the “goals” or “needs” of individuals that 
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indicate a certain direction and persistence of behavior (Winter, 2003, p.23).  These are reflected 
in Freud’s conception of “libidinal” vs. “aggressive” motives, and in clinical settings are 
typically assessed through indirect means such as the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) 
(Winter, 2003).  Regarding the analysis of political leaders specifically, however, motives are 
typically assessed “at-a-distance” in three, separate domains: power, affiliation, and achievement 
(Winter, 2005).  David Winter (2005) has made an important contribution to the understanding 
of presidents specifically through examination of these motives, finding that the “power” motive 
is strongly associated with “greatness” as measured by presidential historians, entry into war, and 
James David Barber’s “active-positive” type (i.e. employing a high degree of energy in one’s 
work and enjoying one’s job).  He also shows that the “achievement” motivation is positively 
associated with Barber’s “active-negative” type (i.e. employing a high degree of energy in one’s 
work, but gaining no joy from such) and level of presidential idealism (Winter, 2005).  This 
seems counterintuitive, as we might expect a focus on achievement (being driven by a need to 
get things done) to better represent effective presidents than the need for power.  However, the 
pleasure and drive intrinsic to the work of power-motivated individuals are more conducive to 
positive outcomes overall than the squashed idealism of achievement-oriented presidents such as 
Woodrow Wilson and Richard Nixon (Winter, 2005, p.561).  Further, Winter (2005) shows that 
presidents scoring highly in “affiliation” are more likely to conclude arms control agreements 
and to become involved in scandals than others; this indicates that, similar to power and 
achievement, affiliation contains both positive and negative characteristics. 
The Operational Code  
Apart from traits and motives, another psychological component of political leaders 
studied by political scientists is that of “cognitive belief system” in terms of the “self in 
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situation.”  This construct is assessed through the “operational code” (Walker, Schafer, and 
Young, 1998), originally developed by Nathan Leites (1951) in a study funded by the U.S. 
government to assess the beliefs of the Soviet Politburo.  Leites found through qualitative, 
interpretive analysis that these individuals possessed values, beliefs, and schema for 
understanding the world that was very different from the average American policy maker.  Since 
Leites’s initial foray, operational code analyses have evolved significantly, becoming a 
replicable, “scientifically” acceptable system of analysis (see George, 1979) that is now 
examined through a computerized content analysis program.  The operational code looks at both 
philosophical and instrumental beliefs based on the rhetoric of political leaders, assessed through 
verb usage and strength (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998).  More specifically, the operational 
code deals with schemata: an individual’s private and subjective principles that order his/her 
relationship with the social environment (George, 1979). 
Operational code beliefs are further broken down from their philosophical and 
instrumental subgroups into 10 indices that evaluate specific beliefs regarding preferences for 
conflict or cooperation, the kinds of tactics preferred for achieving these ends, risk orientation, 
perceived hostility or friendliness (image perception) of the international system, likely 
realization of political values, predictability of the political future, perceptions of control over 
others, and the role of chance regarding political outcomes (Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998).  
It is important to note that operational code beliefs are not deterministic as a rational actor 
explanation would be, but are used by individuals as a “set of guidelines-heuristical aids to 
decision,” that define an individual’s particular type of “bounded rationality” (George, 1979, 
p.103). 
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In recent years, the operational code belief systems of presidents have been explored at 
length.  Presidents examined include Woodrow Wilson, Lyndon Johnson, Jimmy Carter, George 
H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush (Walker, 1995; Walker, Schafe r, and Young, 
1998, 1999, 2003; Walker and Schafer, 2000a; Schafer, Young, and Walker, 2002; Robison, 
N.d.).  Regarding U.S. presidents, operational code analyses have examined the effects of the end 
of the Cold War on beliefs and the incidence of foreign policy conflicts, the effects of examining 
spontaneous versus prepared and private versus public remarks on belief measurement, the 
effects of crisis situations and learning on belief change, and the effects of individual differences 
regarding the democratic peace thesis, amongst others (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998, 1999; 
Dille, 2000; Marfleet, 2000; Schafer and Crichlow, 2000; Walker and Schafer, 2005). 
Examinations of presidents have also shown that an individual’s operational code, though 
fairly stable in a peace-time environment, can change over time following from an insidious, 
slow-moving crisis such as Vietnam, or quickly given a strong shock to a policy-maker’s system 
such as the Iranian hostage crisis and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan late in Carter’s Presidency 
(Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998; Walker and Schafer, 2000b).  This conflicts with Alexander 
George’s (1979) argument that the operational code deals with generalized, interconnected 
beliefs as opposed to “specific or delineated objects” (George, 1979, p.97). 
Despite the appealing suggestions stemming from all this work on the U.S. Presidency, 
however, the relationship between these psychological factors and large scale, quantitative 
outcomes have not been explored at length.  This is surprising, as connections between event 
data and the operational code were recognized as early as the initial phases of the current 
operational code computer program’s construction (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998, p.182). 
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 For this paper, operational code beliefs regarding the international environment will be 
examined to assess the degree that these presidential beliefs influence foreign policy “events.”  
Specifically, this study is a time-series analysis looking at the relationship between presidential 
world image perceptions (or perceived “nature of the political universe”-measured in terms of 
friendliness or hostility), and strategic orientation (measured in terms of cooperation or conflict) 
on foreign policy actions (also measured in cooperation or conflict) toward the Middle East, as 
initiated by the U.S.  This study differs from those done before in two important ways.  First, no 
study to date has looked so extensively at presidential operational codes over time.  In collecting 
data, I attempted to measure (at least) every major U.S. presidential foreign policy speech from 
Ronald Reagan until George W. Bush, resulting in over 1500 speeches being assessed in whole 
or in part.  These range from those as central to outlining foreign policy as State of the Union 
addresses to relatively insignificant comments from photo sessions (see the method section for a 
fuller description of speeches chosen).  Secondly, this study differs from others in that no known 
previous study on presidential influence has looked at such an extensive number of policy events 
as here.  For the dependent variable of “U.S. foreign policy action,” 20,392 U.S.- initiated events 
toward the Middle East were coded overall (14,313 events initiated in the Middle East toward the 
U.S. were coded as a control).  Thus, the scope of this project is larger than any known work on 
the operational code (on both the independent and dependent variable sides of the equation), and 
the hope is that generalizations following from findings here will be justifiable and useful toward 
understanding what role the operational code plays in foreign policy decision-making. 
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HYPOTHESES 
 For this analysis, I examine the degree to which U.S. presidential operational codes 
coincide with U.S. foreign policy.  Specifically, I am exploring the influence of presidential 
“image of the other” and “strategic preferences” on U.S. foreign policy outcomes in the form of 
“events” directed toward Middle Eastern states, each aggregated monthly.  Broad expectations 
are that U.S. presidential operational codes will demonstrate a moderate to high level of 
association with policy actions, controlling for contextual constraints.  I hypothesize that those 
presidents who see the international environment as hostile and prefer the use of conflict abroad 
will influence U.S. actions in the Middle East in a negative and conflictual direction, whereas 
those whose beliefs are more positive and co-operational will influence U.S. policy actions in a 
cooperative manner.  Therefore: 
H1: U.S. presidential operational code measures on the P-1 (image of the international 
environment) index will be positively and strongly associated with U.S. policy actions toward 
the Middle East (on a -=conflict, +=cooperation scale). 
H2: U.S. presidential operational code measures on the I-1 (strategic orientation toward 
the international environment) index will be positively and strongly associated with U.S. policy 
actions toward the Middle East (on a -=conflict, +=cooperation scale). 
The above will likely be conditioned by various contextual factors.1  Some of these 
constraints are added here in order to promote the explanatory robustness of the model, and to 
help isolate independent variable effects (see the method section for a fuller discussion of these 
variables).  While most of the variables included examined in this project come from other 
research on U.S. foreign policy influences of one type or another, two of these are novel, lagged 
variables which were created from the event database from which the dependent variable was 
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drawn.  As such, and as I expect that these variables will yield a strong degree of influence on 
the dependent variable, I will describe and spell out hypotheses for these variables here.  The 
first of these is a measure assessing the degree of U.S. policy continuity over time, and the 
second is a measure of “policy reciprocation,” stemming from the realist notion that external 
events dictate, to a large degree, what a policy-maker must do in order to survive in an anarchic 
international system (Greenstein, 1992; Astorino-Courtois, 1998-see the method section for a 
fuller explanation).  The influence of these variables will be tested by examining (in the month 
prior to U.S. action as measured with the dependent variable) the influence on U.S. foreign 
policy actions in the Middle East by previous actions of the U.S. toward the Middle East (policy 
continuity) and of Middle Eastern states toward the U.S. (reciprocation).  Expectations are that 
U.S. actions at one month will logically carry over to the next, and that as states act belligerently 
or peacefully toward the U.S., the U.S. can be expected to retaliate in kind, following the 
literature on reciprocation and escalation (Axelrod, 1984; Holsti, 1989; Leng, 1993, 2004).  
Therefore: 
H3 (Policy continuity hypothesis): Earlier actions taken by the U.S. toward Middle 
Eastern states will determine U.S. action toward Middle Eastern states at a later time. 
H4 (Reciprocation hypothesis): Actions taken toward the U.S. by other states prior to 




 An OLS regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses laid out in the theory section.  
Due in part to their method of construction, high levels of multicollinearity are likely between 
the two psychological variables of interest here.2  Thus, separate models were run for analyses 
examining the image of the other (P-1) and strategic orientation (I-1).  Other independent 
variables measured include lagged actions by the U.S. toward the Middle East, lagged actions 
from Middle East states directed toward the U.S., degree of public support for the president, the 
price of oil (adjusted for inflation), percentage of the U.S. populace unemployed, and the average 
S-Scores between the U.S. and Middle East states, as each of these variables might be expected 
to have an influence on foreign policy outcomes (Ostrom and Job, 1986; Scanlon, 1992; Dassel, 
1998; Lindley-French, 2003; Jhaveri, 2004-see below for more).  The dependent variable is U.S. 
foreign policy actions toward other states as measured through event data from the Levant 
database.  Regression analyses were conducted for the U.S. relationship with all Middle Eastern 
states generally, with non-Israeli states alone, with Israel by itself, and with all Middle Eastern 
states for each president individually. 
The Operational Code  
The operational code scales leaders on two broad indices: that of philosophical and 
instrumental beliefs.  As no one is all knowing, actors’ “philosophical” perspectives in the form 
of heuristic beliefs frame their understandings of and expectations about the world, “bounding” it 
to their perceptions.  Conversely, an actor’s instrumental beliefs reflect how an actor “bounds” 
alternative methods of dealing with a given situation (Hermann, 1980).  These two broad 
categories are further broken down into ten indices (five philosophical beliefs and five 
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instrumental beliefs-Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998) which make up the operational code as 
it is currently used.  These specific beliefs are arranged in hierarchical order, where the first 
measures of each type (the nature of the political universe [P-1] and strategic preference [I-1]) 
are the “master beliefs” that summarize the overall balance of a speaker’s attributions across all 
specific beliefs.  As such, the perceived image of the political universe (P-1) and strategic 
approach to goals (I-1) are the operational code indices examined for this project.  The perceived 
image (P-1) variable measures the actor’s perception of the other in terms of friendliness and 
hostility, whereas the strategic approach variable (I-1) measures the actor’s perception of the self 
in terms of conflict and cooperation (see below for a fuller explanation of these variables).  The 
beliefs tapped by the P-1 and I-1 indices are assessed in this study in order to gauge their relative 
merit regarding influence on foreign policy actions. 
Other operational code indices were excluded from this analysis because most of these 
shouldn’t have an effect on the dependent variable of interest here.  For example, an actor’s 
belief in the role of chance, belief in the predictability of the political future, and risk orientation 
do not intuitively indicate a direct, linear relationship with degree of cooperative/conflictual 
actions abroad.  These variables might facilitate whether or the degree to which a leader may 
pursue a particular strategy, but a theoretical justification for a direct linear effect here is not 
apparent.  On the other hand, the perception of the opposition as hostile (as assessed here with 
the P-1 variable) could easily be imagined to correlate with hostile actions toward this opposition 
(to act otherwise would be to court disaster in a realist framework).  Further, one might expect 
that a leader’s preference for cooperation (assessed here with the I-1 variable) would lead to 
cooperative action abroad.  These expectations are intuitive and straightforward.  Additionally, 
the two variables examined here are the “master” beliefs that are disaggregated or manipulated in 
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some way to create the other operational code measures.  Thus, P-1 and I-1 are seen to be the 
most explicit, intuitive, and important direct, linear operational code influences on foreign policy 
actions (as measured in a cooperative/conflictual fashion), and thus are the indices used in this 
study. 
The operational code was evaluated through the Verbs in Context System (VICS) in the 
“Profiler Plus” computer program (Young, 2001).  This system focuses on verbs, as they are the 
direct linguistic representation of power relationships (Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998).  
Operational codes were assessed through this method for every U.S. president from Ronald 
Reagan to George W. Bush.  Only general foreign policy-oriented speeches were coded, taken 
from presidential web sites (Bush, George H.W., 2005; Bush, George W., 2005; Clinton; 2005; 
Reagan, 2005).  Further, only prepared speeches were assessed, including personal remarks prior 
to press conferences and photo sessions, State of the Union addresses, isolated statements, radio 
addresses, and speeches to foreign governing bodies, interest groups, “town hall” meetings, and 
the United Nations, among others.  Selection criteria were to collect as many of these speeches as 
possible given the broad “foreign policy” criteria.  Further, pleasantries and references to 
Congress were minimized to reduce bias (of overly cooperative measures in the former, and 
treatment by the computer program of Congress as a foreign entity, or “outgroup,” in the latter).  
No systematic sampling was attempted beyond this, as the largest possible “population” of 
speeches was desired.3  Ultimately, more than 1,500 speeches were measured from 1981 to 2004. 
Spontaneous remarks were not used, as previous research has shown that coding these 
will lead to different results than coding prepared speeches (Schafer and Crichlow, 2000).  Apart 
from this issue, however, some may argue that measuring prepared speeches is inferior to 
measuring spontaneous responses, as the former are too prone to impression-management and 
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influence by speech writers, making them generally less “realistic.”4  Though these arguments 
would be valid if we were interested in assessing private beliefs regarding life outside the 
political arena, they are less relevant regarding presidential “operational codes.”  Jerel Rosati 
(2002) argues that operational code beliefs are “those beliefs to which an individual subscribes 
as an actual decision maker” (p.142-emphasis added).  What this means is that the operational 
code is a reflection not of unconscious psychological attributes, but of overt, cognitive beliefs 
associated with political decision making specifically.  Thus, even if a speaker does not write a 
speech, as long as the speech reflects the policies and beliefs of a given administration from that 
speaker’s point of view, then this is a reflection of that speaker’s operational code.  Further, 
despite the fact that U.S. presidents typically speak with a surplus of spin and seem to have an 
aversion to specifics, it is doubtful that a president would speak words incompatible with his 
beliefs about the nature of things and his preferred policy outcomes. 
 Prior to coding, references to “in-groups” by each president were noted, and used by the 
Verbs in Context System (VICS-the computer program used to run the operational code) to 
differentiate “self” from “other” references, as this is key to extracting operational code indices 
(Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998).  Following coding, results were aggregated to the month to 
provide enough data for adequate assessment of the operational code (the minimum acceptable 
number of verbs coded per month were 18).  Where data were unavailable or insufficient for a 
given month, averages were used from the three months prior to and after the month of interest.5 
P-1: Image of the External Political Environment 
 The first operational code index used here is identified as “P-1,” or perceived image of 
the political “universe.”  This variable addresses the assumptions and premises made by political 
actors regarding: “the fundamental nature of politics and political conflict, and the image of the 
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opponent” (George, 1979, p. 100).  Walker, Schafer and Young (1998) go into more detail, 
stating that: 
The key assumption here is that beliefs about how others approach and pursue their goals 
in the political universe define the nature of politics, political conflict, and the image of 
the opponent for the leader. (p. 178, emphasis added) 
 
In other words, this is a critical component of one’s interpretation of political reality as seen 
through the actions of others in the political system.  The P-1 scale is calculated in VICS by the 
speaker’s net attribution of cooperative versus negative valences to others, the justification/belief 
being that “. . . the more cooperative the leader’s diagnosis of the nature of the political universe, 
the higher the net frequency of cooperative attributions to others in the political universe” 
(Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998, p. 178, emphasis in original).  Thus, positive scores 
regarding perceived image of the other represent a feeling of friendliness in the international 
system, whereas negative scores signify perceived hostility.  The literature on Image theory more 
fully explores this issue, specifically regarding how this phenomenon affects policy selection and 
associated tactics.6 
I-1: Strategic Preferences 
 The “I-1” index is also assessed in this study, and this refers to the “strategic orientation” 
of a political actor.  In George’s (1979) assessment, this belief is an actor’s perceived “best 
approach for selecting goals for political action” (p. 100).  Again, Walker, Schafer and Young 
(1998) elaborate, stating that I-1 identifies the “strategic direction the leader adopts” which 
influence which goals a leader will select and how s/he will select them (p. 179).  This index is 
calculated through VICS by assessing a leader’s net attribution of positive versus negative self 
valences.  The justification/belief for this calculation is that “the more cooperative the leader’s 
strategic approach to goals, the higher the net frequency of cooperative attributions to the self” 
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(Walker, Schafer and Young, 1998, p. 179).  In other words, a positive score on this index 
indicates a preference for cooperation and a negative score indicates a preference for conflict.  
Thus, the P-1 index is concerned with the actor’s perceptions of the other, whereas the I-1 index 
relates to the actor’s perceptions of the self. 
Event Data 
Event Data as the Dependent Variable 
In an attempt to assess U.S. foreign policy actions beyond the overly narrow range of that 
found in the “use of force” and associated literatures looking only at conflict (Clark, 2001), this 
study assesses all kinds of actions taken by the U.S., both cooperative and conflictual, in the 
form of event data in World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) format.  The event data used were 
taken from Reuter’s news service leads in Lexis-Nexis regarding dyadic events between states of 
interest.  Following this, a computer program used pattern recognition and grammatical parsing 
to determine the kinds of events that occurred, and the actors who were involved in a given 
event.  Filter programs were then used to eliminate irrelevant information, and results were 
displayed in a text file (“Introduction to Event Data Analysis”).  Outputs in this text file are 
given in the WEIS format noted above, which includes the country initiating action, the country 
being acted upon, and the numerically coded type of event taking place (which was later 
rescaled). 
Specifically, the Levant data set was used here, which includes dyadic interactions 
between Middle Eastern states, the US, and the Soviet Union primarily, from April of 1979 until 
June of 2004 (“Levant Data Set,” 2005).  Despite the dataset containing information for the 
USSR, Western Europe, South America, et cetera, this analysis only looks at the interactions 
between the U.S. and states in the Middle East.7  This data includes U.S. actions toward both 
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friendly actors such as Israel, sometimes foes such as Iraq, and others in-between such as Egypt.  
Further, though these actors are generally states, actions by non-state actors are included here as 
well, such as those by “Palestine” and “Kurds” (for the sake of simplicity, however, these actors 
will all be referred to as “states” in the results/discussion sections).  The WEIS event outputs 
noted above were rescaled into a cooperation/conflict interval- level scale (lower scores=more 
negative events, higher scores=more positive events) based on Goldstein conversions (“Keds 
Project Modified WEIS Event Codes,” 2005).  Data were aggregated monthly corresponding 
with the operational code aggregation.  The method of aggregation to replace missing data noted 
in the operational code section was also used when aggregating event data.8 
Event Data as a Measure of Short-Term U.S. Policy Continuity 
 The lag (by one month) of the dependent variable was included in models here as an 
independent variable to assess short-term continuity in U.S. foreign policy.  This follows from 
the bureaucratic politics approach, which argues that standard operating procedures, constant 
bargaining between agencies, and maintenance of the status quo are strong influences on foreign 
policy making (Allison and Halperin, 1972; Drezner, 2000; Jones, 2001; Christensen and Redd, 
2004).  Following from this, policies over time could be expected to remain more comparable 
than divergent.  As such, the similarity of U.S. policy actions from one month to the next will be 
taken into account in this analysis as a test of policy continuity. 
Event Data as a Measure of Reciprocation against Actions by Middle Eastern States 
 Apart from looking at event data purely in an attempt to assess U.S. actions abroad, this 
study is also interested in actions against the U.S. by Middle Eastern states.  These actions may 
constrain the president and the U.S. foreign policy apparatus toward acting in a knee-jerk 
fashion, particularly if an act (or a set of actions, in this case) is conflictual, following from Leng 
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and others’ work on escalation (Schelling, 1960; Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Holsti, 1989; Leng, 
1993, 2004).  However, this study examines both conflict and cooperation, and as such more 
closely tests Axelrod’s (1984) “tit- for-tat” hypothesis that reciprocation works both ways.  Thus, 
an eye for an eye is expected, as is reciprocal back scratching.  As with the continuity variable, 
actions by Middle Eastern states toward the U.S. lagged by one month will be added into this 
study’s models to account for the realist notion that a state will largely act following the actions 
of another. 
Public Support 
Analysis of international versus domestic factors regarding the president’s decision to use 
force has shown that this is explained largely by influences from three domains: the 
international, domestic, and personal/political environments (Ostrom and Job, 1986, p.541).  
Though all of these factors have been shown to matter significantly in Ostrom and Job’s (1986) 
study, public support for the president was shown to be the most important, as changes in public 
support levels strongly affected the likelihood of the use of force abroad.  Ostrom and Job (1986) 
further found that high levels of public support allow a “buffer zone” for political use of force, 
mid-range levels may lead to the use of force if the president believed he would regain lost 
approval levels, and low levels of support result in presidential inaction (p.558).  Thus, the 
greater the degree of public support, the greater the likelihood that force will be used abroad.  
James and Oneal (1991) supported Ostrom and Job’s finding by showing through more complex 
analyses that domestic political variables, particularly presidential popularity, were still of the 
utmost importance in determining the use of force.  Though these and other works (Morgan and 
Bickers, 1992; Miller, 1995) generally give support the traditional “diversionary war” 
hypothesis, Clark (2001) argued that similar processes lead to less extreme outcomes by moving 
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the debate away from “the use of force” bias, and into the realm of aggressive economic policies 
abroad.  This distinction may have repercussions for the larger “use of force” literature, and 
certainly for this study, which examines a broad range of both cooperative and conflictual policy 
actions, be they economic, political, or military. 
Public support data were assessed through monthly Gallup polls taken from Reagan’s 
inauguration until June of 2004.  Findings from the use of force literature would suggest that 
higher levels of public support would result in the increased incidence of conflictual actions 
abroad (i.e. a negative relationship between degree of public support and the dependent variable 
of U.S. policy actions toward the Middle East is expected).  This, if found, would signify that the 
increased use of conflict abroad is an automatic preference of the president, constrained only by 
the public’s willingness to support him and his policies.  Obviously, this perspective significantly 
downplays the role of presidential agency. 
Price of Crude Oil 
 Oil is of critical strategic importance to the United States.  Often the protection of oil 
resources and the development of foreign policy around this goal is taken as a given when 
assessing U.S. foreign policy (Razi, 1976; Fishlow, 1978/79; Khokhar and Wiberg-Jorgensen, 
2001).  As a fair percentage of U.S. oil has originated from the Middle East over the years, the 
price of oil was included here to account for the power of this resource.  This variable reflects 
“spot oil” prices in dollars per barrel taken from the St. Louis Federal Reserve web site (“Spot 
Oil Prices: West Texas Intermediate,” 2005), which takes its data from “Wall Street Journal / 
Haver Analytics.”  This data were adjusted using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for all urban 
consumers monthly (“Consumer Price Index,” 2005) to account for the affect of price inflation 
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over time.  Additionally, to facilitate interpretation of descriptives in the results section, prices 
were represent “December 2004” dollars. 
Certainly, rising prices of oil result in increased attention by the U.S. public, and thus 
increase the likelihood that some U.S. action will result.  Expectations might then be that the rise 
in oil prices by OPEC states would result in sticks by the U.S. toward Middle East states in the 
hopes of forcing these states to reduce oil prices and thus stave off domestic anxiety (i.e. a 
negative relationship is expected between levels of unemployment and the dependent variable).  
Though these sticks would usually be found in terms of trade or reduced aid, this could also be 
extrapolated from the often-used argument that the 1990 war against Iraq was initiated in order 
to protect threatened oil reserves in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
Unemployment 
 The economy is an essential component to almost all political decisions made by the 
president.  The use of force literature takes this into consideration (Ostrom and Job, 1986; 
Fordham, 1998), where increased unemployment (or “economic misery”) was found to equate 
with higher levels of conflict making the use of conflict “more useful and less costly to employ” 
(Fordham, 1998, p.567).  Unemployment is used in this study (as it was with these other studies) 
as a proxy to represent the robustness of the American economy.  This measure represents 
seasonally adjusted percent of the population aged 16 and over unemployed monthly.  Data were 
taken from the U.S. Department of Labor website (“Bureau of Labor Statistics online”, 2005).  As 
the use of force literature argues that the worse off the economy, the more conflictual the U.S. 
will be abroad (i.e. a negative relationship between unemployment and the dependent variable of 
U.S. policy actions toward the Middle East), this is the expectation here.9 
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S-Scores 
 The final variable included in this study is the regional weighted “S-score,” a measure of 
the type of alliances held between state dyads.  This measure is similar to the “tau b,” and 
evaluates the “rank order correlation for two states’ alliance portfolios” (Scott and Stam, 2000).10  
More specifically, the degree of agreement between “alliances” are assessed here, ranging 
(similar to tau b outcomes) on a scale from -1, representing totally opposite alliance agreements, 
to +1, indicating complete agreement in the alliances formed.  The average S-score between the 
U.S. and relevant Middle Eastern states (either all these states, all non-Israel states, or Israel 
alone) were calculated for each year through the “EUGene” program (Scott and Stam, 2000), 
which only provides data up until the year 2001.11  Further, as data are only available yearly, 





 Table 1 gives the means, standard deviations, sample sizes, and lowest and highest values 
for all variables used in this analysis.  Some general observations can be made here.  First off, 
based on an assessment of event data, it appears that the U.S. treats Israel (mean=.552) far more 
favorably than it does non-Israeli Middle Eastern states on average (mean=-.213; recall that the 
range of possible scores on the event data variables is from -10 to +10, and that positive scores 
here indicate cooperative actions, whereas negative scores indicate conflict).  Israeli (mean=.541) 
and non-Israeli (mean=-.464) actions toward the United States yield similar findings.  Following 
this, it seems strange that the U.S. and Israel’s S-Scores are so dissimilar (mean=-.187).  
Regarding psychological measures, the presidents examined here appear to see the political 
universe (P-1) as more friendly than hostile (mean=.373), and prefer cooperative over conflictual 
strategies (I-1: mean=.595).12 
 Table 2 is a correlation matrix of all general variables examined here (excluding non-
Israeli and Israel-specific variables).  Many of these variables are extremely highly correlated (at 
the .001 and .05 two-tailed significance levels).  Of particular interest here is that, relating to the 
dependent variable (“U.S. Action”), the scores for P-1 (image of the political universe), actions 
by Middle East state actors, unemployment, public support, and S-Scores are all significantly 
correlated.  This makes a regression analysis useful in teasing out which of these relationships 
matter more.  Unfortunately, the correlation matrix also seems to indicate already that the I-1 
variable (presidential strategic preferences toward foreign actors) will not yield significant 
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findings in the statistical analysis below as hypothesized, as it is not highly correlated with the 
dependent variable. 
Table 1: Descriptives for All Variables 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
P-1 (image of the other) 282 0.373 0.189 -0.222 0.960 
I-1 (strategic orientation) 282 0.595 0.226 -0.429 1.000 
U.S. Action toward All 
Middle East 282 -0.075 1.335 -6.231 2.361 
All Middle East Action 
toward U.S. 282 -0.244 1.147 -5.496 2.486 
U.S. to all Non-Israel 282 -0.213 1.465 -6.231 3.729 
All Non-Israel to U.S. 282 -0.464 1.260 -5.496 2.967 
U.S. to Israel 282 0.552 1.377 -4.750 4.667 
Israel to U.S.  282 0.541 1.782 -9.000 6.500 
Unemployment 282 6.383 2.904 3.800 48.000 
Public Support 281 56.817 10.532 29.000 90.000 
Price of Oil 283 34.536 15.390 13.100 83.120 
S-Scores All Middle East 240 -0.283 0.190 -0.584 -0.060 
S-Scores Non-Israel 240 -0.288 0.190 -0.587 -0.064 
S-Scores Israel 240 -0.187 0.190 -0.510 0.031 
 
Individual President Descriptives 
Operational Code Indices 
 Descriptive breakdowns for each president on the psychological variables P-1 and I-1 are 
given in Tables 3 and 4.  Based on mean scores, the president examined here who sees the 
international environment in most friendly terms based on his P-1 measure is George H.W. Bush 
(mean=.461), whereas the least friendly perceptions of the outside world are held by George W. 
Bush (mean=.282).  Similarly, on the I-1 measure (assessing preferred strategic-orientation 
toward dealing with the outside world), George H.W. Bush most strongly prefers cooperation 
(mean=.705) whereas George W. Bush least strongly prefers cooperation (mean=.414).  Though 
none of the presidents examined here yield a one standard deviation shift from the sample group 









Table 2: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 






Support Price of Oil 
S-Scores 
(M. East) 
P-1 --- 0.388*** 0.202*** 0.152** 0.049 -0.126** 0.193*** 0.010 
I-1 0.388*** --- 0.094 0.156*** 0.045 -0.137** -0.091 0.006 
U.S. Action 0.202*** 0.094 --- 0.410*** 0.154*** -0.142** 0.161*** 0.189*** 
Middle East 
Action 0.152** 0.156*** 0.410*** --- 0.065 -0.169*** 0.189*** 0.192*** 
Unemployment 0.049 0.045 0.154*** 0.065 --- -0.417*** 0.301*** 0.471*** 
Public Support -0.126** -0.137** -0.142** -0.169*** -0.417*** --- -.210*** -0.253*** 
Price of Oil .193*** .091 .161*** .189*** .368*** -.210*** --- .592*** 




the .01, 2-tailed confidence level within this subset of scores.  This indicates that there is 
a fair amount of variation amongst the presidents examined here, book-ended by the 
Bush’s relatively extreme scores.  This may make it somewhat difficult to say that there 
is truly a U.S. presidential “operational code” that constrains the actions of different 
presidents in similar ways.  However, the even more extreme differences between non-
U.S. leaders and U.S. presidents (see note 12 for a discussion of this finding) and the 
generally positive P-1 and I-1 orientations of those examined here (all presidents yield a 
score of at least +.28 on the P-1 index and +.41 on I-1) indicates that, despite the above, 
presidents may be more similar than they are different regarding image of the other and 
strategic preferences. 
Table 3: Descriptives for Operational Code Indices P-1 and I-1 
 
  N Mean Std. Deviation Min Score 
Max 
Score Z-scores* 
Reagan 96 0.385 0.169 -0.070 0.714 0.075 
H W Bush 48 0.461 0.171 -0.014 0.818 0.497 
Clinton 96 0.356 0.203 -0.222 0.960 -0.087 
W Bush 42 0.282 0.174 -0.059 0.600 -0.492 
P-1 
Overall 282 0.373 0.189 -0.222 0.960  
        
Reagan 96 0.626 0.189 -0.333 1.000 0.187 
H W Bush 48 0.705 0.169 0.300 1.000 0.553 
Clinton 96 0.588 0.215 0.000 1.000 0.011 
W Bush 42 0.414 0.278 -0.429 0.864 -0.795 
I-1 
Overall 282 0.595 0.226 -0.429 1.000  
*Compared against the group average and standard deviation listed in Table 1. 
 
Event Data for U.S. and All Middle East States 
Tables 5 and 6 show descriptive and ANOVA results for all presidents examined 
here on the general event data variables of U.S. actions toward all Middle East states and 
all Middle East states toward the U.S. Unlike results regarding the psychological 
variables above, there are no major differences between the presidents here, signified by  
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Table 4: ANOVA between All Presidents on P-1 and I-1 





Groups 0.764 3.000 0.255 7.662*** 
P-1 
Within 
Groups 9.240 278.000 0.033  
Between 
Groups 2.046 3.000 0.682 15.408*** 
I-1 
Within 
Groups 12.306 278.000 0.044  
***prob <.001 
 
insignificant ANOVA results.  This indicates that though presidents may differ in their 
beliefs, U.S. actions toward the Middle East and Middle Eastern policies toward the U.S., 
in general, are not significantly affected based upon which given U.S. president is in 
office.  However, the most hostile actions both toward the Middle East and the U.S. on 
average occurred during the George W. Bush administration, while the most cooperative 
(or at least the least conflictual) actions from both sides occurred during the Reagan 
administration. 
Table 5: Individual President Descriptives for General Event Data 
 
  N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Reagan 96 0.159 1.226 -3.192 2.361 
H W Bush 48 -0.121 1.138 -3.660 2.118 
Clinton 96 -0.176 1.628 -6.231 1.782 





East Total 282 -0.075 1.335 -6.231 2.361 
       
Reagan 95 -0.031 1.126 -3.617 2.486 
H W Bush 48 -0.211 1.120 -4.100 1.664 
Clinton 96 -0.392 1.291 -5.496 2.254 





the U.S. Total 281 -0.247 1.148 -5.496 2.486 
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Table 6: Individual President ANOVA Results for General Event Data 











Groups 491.963 278 1.770  
Between 











 Table 7 and 8 show results for all other variables (excluding the Israel and non-
Israel specific variables) as they differed during each president’s time in office.  Table 7 
shows that on average, unemployment was highest under Reagan and lowest under 
Clinton, public support was lowest for Reagan and highest for George W. Bush, the price 
of oil (adjusted to account for inflation) was highest under George W. Bush and cheapest  
under Clinton, and that S-Scores for all Middle Eastern states were the most negative 
under Clinton and the least negative under Reagan (though the average S-Score for the 
Middle East is negative for all presidents).  Additionally, ANOVA results in Table 8 
show that there are significant differences at the .001, two-tailed significance level for 
each of these variables based on inter-presidential differences.13  Thus, though it might 
stand to reason that the president would only yield a low level of influence on some of 
these variables (the level of domestic unemployment and price of oil stick out as 
variables in this category), based on these findings, these variables are not stable across 
presidential administrations. 
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Table 7: Individual Presidential Results on Control Variables 
  N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Reagan 96 7.536 1.457 5.300 10.800 
H W Bush 48 6.304 0.944 5.000 7.800 
Clinton 96 5.204 0.958 3.800 7.300 




Total 282 6.383 2.904 3.800 48.000 
Reagan 96 53.005 7.575 35.000 68.000 
H W Bush 48 60.375 14.460 29.000 89.000 
Clinton 96 55.500 7.378 39.000 73.000 
W Bush 41 64.659 12.167 47.000 90.000 
Public Support 
Total 281 56.817 10.532 29.000 90.000 
Reagan 96 48.536 18.159 44.856 52.215 
H W Bush 48 30.881 5.455 29.297 32.465 
Clinton 96 24.114 5.188 23.063 25.165 
W Bush 42 30.380 4.587 28.951 31.810 
Price of Oil (per 
barrel) 
Total 282 34.513 15.413 32.706 36.320 
Reagan 96 -0.074 0.013 -0.105 -0.060 
H W Bush 48 -0.448 0.150 -0.584 -0.214 
Clinton 96 -0.411 0.070 -0.457 -0.233 
W Bush --- --- --- --- --- 
S-Scores for U.S. 
and All Middle East 
States 
Total 240 -0.283 0.190 -0.584 -0.060 
 
Table 8: ANOVA results for All Presidents on Control Variables 




Groups 262.378 3 87.459 11.542*** Unemployment 
Within Groups 2106.573 278 7.578  
Between 
Groups 4690.094 3 1563.365 16.421*** Public Support 
Within Groups 26371.217 277 95.203  
Between 
Groups 30608.226 3 10202.742 78.478*** Price of Oil 
Within Groups 36142.223 278 130.008  
Between 
Groups 
7.074 3 2.358 360.430*** S-Scores All Middle 
East States 




U.S. Actions toward All Middle Eastern States (Including S-Scores) 
 In Table 9 I report OLS regression results for both the philosophical (P-1) and 
instrumental (I-1) psychological models regarding U.S. interactions with all Middle 
Eastern states from the Levant database from 1981 to 2001 (the years 2001-2004 are not 
included in Tables 9-11 as no S-Scores are available for this timeframe--Tables 12-14 
exclude S-Scores and thus include the George W. Bush years).  The first model examines 
the perceived image, or nature, of the political universe as perceived by U.S. presidents 
(P-1) on U.S. foreign policy actions.  Based on this model, the coefficients for U.S. 
policy continuity (b=.341, t=5.085, prob<.001), previous actions by Middle Eastern states 
(b=.205, t=2.606, prob<.05), and presidential image of the political universe (b=.861, 
t=2.026, prob<.05) yield strong, statistically significant effects at the .05, two-tailed level 
on the character of U.S. action toward Middle Eastern states.14  Findings for the policy 
continuity variable show that, regarding Middle East states, previous actions by the U.S. 
provide a good indication of how the U.S. will act in the present.  Thus, if the U.S. acts in 
a generally cooperative manner toward Middle Eastern states this month, it is a safe bet 
that more cooperative actions can be expected next month, and the same can be said 
regarding conflict.  The significant findings for the reciprocation variable indicate that 
previous actions by Middle Eastern states also provide a powerful indication of how the 
U.S. will act in response. 
Thus, as indicated in Table 9, U.S. actions in the present also strongly reflect the 
actions of Middle East states at a prior point in time.  The policy continuity and 
reciprocation variables give support to structural theories supporting bureaucratic politics 
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 Table 9: Influences on U.S. Action toward All Middle East States with S-Scores 
Regression (George W. Bush’s term excluded) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 





 b t  b t 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept 0.312 0.396  0.484 0.603 
Previous Actions by the U.S. 
Toward Middle Eastern States [+] 0.341 5.085***  0.353 5.195*** 
Previous Actions From Middle East 
States Toward the U.S. [+] 0.205 2.606**  0.206 2.563** 
Nature of the Political Universe (P-
1) [+] 0.861 2.026**  --- --- 
Strategic Preferences (I-1) [+] --- ---  0.267 0.676 
Unemployment Rate [-] -0.041 -.532  -0.057 -0.737 
Public support for the president [-] -0.006 -.698  -0.007 -0.799 
Price of Oil [-] 0.005 .654  0.008 1.066 
Average S-Scores between the U.S. 
and all Middle Eastern States [+] 
0.583 1.126  0.464 .896 
________________________________________________________________________ 
N 240 240 
R² .286 .274 
Adjusted R² .264 .252 
**prob < .05 
***prob < .001 
 
and realist ideas, respectively, which both downplay the role of individual agency.  
However, significant findings for the P-1 variable (image of the political universe) also 
show that general presidential perception of the “other”15 is a powerful indicator for how 
the U.S. will act toward Middle Eastern states.  Following this, if the other is seen as 
menacing and hostile by the president, the U.S. will tend to act more conflictually, 
whereas if the political universe is viewed as unthreatening and friendly, the U.S. will act 
more cooperatively.  This finding supports elite psychological explanations of 
international behavior, and indicates that it may be in the interest of Middle Eastern 
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leaders to ensure that U.S. presidents view these individuals (and the state/region in 
which they have political power) in a favorable light.  Coefficients for level of U.S. 
unemployment, degree of public support for the president, price of oil, and average 
alliance scores (S-Scores) do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in 
this model, suggesting that these variables do not have a systematic effect on the 
dependent variable. 
The second model in Table 9 tests the effect of presidential strategic orientation 
(I-1) on U.S. foreign policy action toward all Levant states.  Based on results from this 
model, the coefficients for strategic preferences (I-1), unemployment rate, public support 
for the president, the price of oil, and average S-Scores between the U.S. and Middle 
Eastern states each fail to reach statistical significance.  Again, this indicates that these 
variables have no systematic effect on the dependent variable.  However, the coefficients 
for policy continuity (b=.353, t=5.195, prob<.001) and reciprocation from other states’ 
actions (b=.206, t=2.563, prob<.05) still signify a strong, positive relationship with the 
dependent variable.  Thus, the beliefs of presidents regarding others (measured through 
the P-1 variable: seeing “others” as either friendly or hostile) appear to have a stronger 
impact on U.S. policy actions toward Middle Eastern states than presidents’ own 
preferences for action (as measured by the I-1 variable).  Explained another way, the 
United States’ presidential image of the other seems to be a far better predictor of how 
the U.S. will act in the Middle East than perceptions of the self.  Additionally, following 
results from the I-1 model in Table 9, the structural factors of policy continuity and 
actions by other states are still shown to be strong indicators of what U.S. actions toward 
the Middle East might be. 
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U.S. Actions toward Non-Israel Middle Eastern States (Including S-Scores) 
Table 10 shows results from all U.S. presidents against non-Israel Middle Eastern 
states from the Levant data set.  These models were run in order to test the usefulness of 
the independent variables of interest in this study when the U.S.’s principle ally in the 
Middle East (Israel) is removed from the picture.  Again, the coefficients for U.S. policy 
continuity signify a strong, positive relationship on both the philosophical (P-1) and 
instrumental (I-1) models (P-1: b=.382, t=5.723, prob<.001; I-1: b=.390, t=5.793, 
prob<.001).  This indicates that pre-existing polices strongly condition current and future 
U.S. policy actions toward non-Israeli Middle Eastern states.  Further, in the P-1 model, 
the coefficient for perceived image of the political universe (P-1) remains positive and 
moderately significant (b=.864, t=1.818, prob=.070), while instrumental, strategic 
preferences (in the I-1 model) still yield no statistically significant effect.  When looking 
at non-Israeli Middle Eastern states, as with all Middle Eastern states including Israel, the 
image of the other (P-1) seems to have an influence on non-Israeli Middle East states 
beyond that of personal strategic preferences.  Interestingly, the reciprocation variable 
loses statistical significance when Israel is taken out of the picture, and though it is 
unclear precisely why this may be the case, this will be further explored toward the end 
of the regression results section.  The coefficients for unemployment rate, public support, 
price of oil, and S-Scores also fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance 
against non-Israel Middle East states. 
U.S. Actions toward Israel (Including S-Scores) 
Table 11 shows regression results for U.S. actions toward Israel in isolation.  Here 
no coefficient reaches statistical significance in either model.  Previous actions by the  
 34 











 b t  b t 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept 0.401 0.455  0.613 0.682 
Previous Actions by U.S. Toward 
Non-Israel Middle Eastern States [+] 0.382 5.723***  0.390 5.793*** 
Previous Actions From Non-Israel 
Middle East States Toward the U.S. 
[+] 
0.116 1.499  0.122 1.551 
Nature of the Political Universe (P-
1) [+] 0.864 1.816*  --- --- 
Strategic Preferences (I-1) [+] --- ---  0.194 0.442 
Unemployment Rate [-] -0.053 -0.609  -0.068 -0.777 
Public support for the president [-] -0.007 -0.635  -0.007 -0.705 
Price of Oil [-] 0.005 0.570  0.008 0.936 
Average S-Scores between the U.S. 
and all Non-Israel Middle Eastern 
States [+] 
0.852 1.496  0.729 1.258 
________________________________________________________________________ 
N 240 240 
R² .266 .256 
Adjusted R² .243 .233 
*prob < .10 
***prob < .001 
U.S. toward Israel and the strategic preferences variable (interestingly) yield the most 
powerful coefficients, but both of these variables fail to reach significance at the .10 
level.  Thus, this model does not seem to capture very important factors influencing U.S. 
policy toward Israel. 
U.S. Actions toward All Middle East States (Excluding S-Scores) 
 Additional models were run excluding S-Scores in order to include data from the 
George W. Bush Administration (from 1981-2004), and these results can be found in  
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Table 11: U.S. Action toward Israel with S-Scores Regression 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 





 b t  b t 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept 0.179 0.186  -0.027 -0.028 
Previous Actions by the U.S. Toward 
Israel [+] 0.087 1.318  0.096 1.461 
Previous Actions From Israel 
Toward the U.S. [+] 
0.026 0.509  0.021 0.412 
Nature of the Political Universe (P-
1) [+] 
0.265 0.515  --- --- 
Strategic Preferences (I-1) [+] --- ---  0.637 1.356 
Unemployment Rate [-] 0.114 1.206  0.098 1.033 
Public support for the president [-] -0.008 -0.694  -0.008 -0.718 
Price of Oil [-] -0.001 -0.127  -0.000 -0.038 
Average S-Scores between the U.S. 
and Israel [+] -0.080 -0.126  -0.064 -0.103 
________________________________________________________________________ 
N 240 240 
R² .036 .042 
Adjusted R² .007 .013 
Tables 12-14.  The P-1 model in Table 12 shows, regarding U.S. interactions with all 
Middle East states, that the coefficients for policy continuity (b=.340, t=5.480, 
prob<.001), reciprocation (b=.206, t=2.825, prob<.05), and presidential image of the 
political universe (b=.881, t=2.375, prob<.05) are positively and statistically significantly 
related to the dependent variable.  These are precisely the same results as that found in 
the model excluding the George W. Bush Administration’s data (in Table 9).  Again, U.S. 
policy carries over from one month to the next, and this seems to be the best predictor of 
what U.S. policy will be toward the Middle East at a given time.  Additionally, previous 
actions by Middle Eastern states toward the U.S. and general presidential perceptions of 
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 b t  b t 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept -0.050 -0.077  0.239 0.396 
Previous Actions by the U.S. 
Toward Middle Eastern States [+] 0.340 5.480***  0.352 5.603*** 
Previous Actions From Middle East 
States Toward the U.S. [+] 0.206 2.825**  0.208 2.808** 
Nature of the Political Universe (P-
1) [+] 0.881 2.375**  --- --- 
Strategic Preferences (I-1) [+] --- ---  0.286 0.930 
Unemployment Rate [-] -0.026 -0.431  -0.052 -0.767 
Public support for the president [-] -0.006 -0.891  -0.008 -1.083 
Price of Oil [-] 0.008 1.265  0.011 1.705* 
________________________________________________________________________ 
N 282 282 
R² .287 .275 
Adjusted R² .272 .259 
*prob < .01 
**prob < .05 
***prob < .001 
the other (P-1) seem to strongly affect U.S. actions toward the Middle East as well. 
In the I-1 model from Table 12, once again, the coefficients for policy continuity 
(b=.352, t=5.603, prob<.001) and reciprocation (b=.208, t=2.808, prob<.05) are strongly 
associated with the dependent variable of U.S. policy actions toward the Middle East.  
Additionally, in Table 12’s I-1 model, the (adjusted) price of oil (b=.011, t=1.705, p<.10) 
also yields a moderate, positive influence on the dependent variable, indicating that 
increasing oil prices lead to an increasing degree of cooperative action initiated by the 
United States, and that lower prices equate with more conflict.  The variables for 
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instrumental preferences (I-1), unemployment, and degree of public support for the 
president have no systematic impact on the dependent variable in either model.  
Therefore, regarding all Middle Eastern states (excluding the moderately significant price 
of oil variable in Table 12), findings hold whether or not George W. Bush’s time in office 
or S-Scores are included. 
U.S. Actions toward Non-Israel Middle East States (Excluding S-Scores) 
 Table 13 shows regression results for U.S. action toward non-Israel Middle East 
states, including data from the George W. Bush Administration.  On both the P-1 and I-1 
models, as with Table 10, the coefficient for policy continuity indicates a strong, positive 
relationship with the dependent variable (P-1: b=.389, t=6.317, prob<.001; I-1: b=.396, 
t=6.395, prob<.001).  Also, in the P-1 model, the coefficient for presidential image of the 
political universe, again, is positive and strong (b=.834, t=2.009, prob<.05), illustrating 
the influence of presidential image of the other on U.S. policy actions.  Further, in the I-1 
model, both the policy reciprocation (b=.122, t=1.670, prob<.10) and (adjusted) price of 
oil (b=.012, t=1.753, prob<.10) coefficients indicate a moderately strong, positive 
relationship with the dependent variable, though respective coefficients only approach 
significance at the .10 level in the P-1 model.  Thus, more positive actions by other states 
and higher oil prices may, to some extent, pull policy in a cooperative direction.  The 
coefficients for presidential strategic preferences in the I-1 model, and unemployment, 
public support and price of oil in both models, again, are insignificant. 
U.S. Actions toward Israel (Excluding S-Scores) 
 Table 14 shows results for a regression analysis on U.S. policy toward Israel 
alone, including the George W. Bush Administration.  Though there are no significant  
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 b t  b t 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept -0.068 -0.094  0.269 0.372 
Previous Actions by the U.S. 
Toward Non-Israel Middle Eastern 
States [+] 
0.389 6.317***  0.396 6.395*** 
Previous Actions From Non-Israel 
Middle East States Toward the U.S. 
[+] 
0.114 1.587  0.122 1.670* 
Nature of the Political Universe (P-
1) [+] 
0.834 2.009**  --- --- 
Strategic Preferences (I-1) [+] --- ---  0.174 0.507 
Unemployment Rate [-] -0.040 -0.521  -0.060 -0.785 
Public support for the president [-] -0.007 -0.874  -0.009 -1.060 
Price of Oil [-] -0.010 1.365  0.012 1.735* 
________________________________________________________________________ 
N 282 282 
R² .265 .254 
Adjusted R² .248 .238 
*prob < .10 
**prob < .05 
***prob < .001 
findings in Table 11 (the Israel-only model including S-Scores), the inclusion of the 
George W. Bush years yields two significant findings.  Perhaps most interestingly, the 
coefficient for the strategic preferences variable in the I-1 model is strongly significant 
(b=.735, t=2.029, prob<.05) at the .05, two-tailed level.  Thus, presidential preferences 
for cooperation (in general) lead to more cooperative acts with Israel, whereas 
preferences for conflict lead to more conflictual acts.  Additionally, the coefficient for the 
policy continuity variable in the I-1 model is also moderately significant at the .10, two-
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tailed level (b=.100, t=1.653, prob<.10), indicating that pre-existing policy seems to yield 
a moderate degree of influence over U.S. decisions.  This indicates that Israel is a special 
case, requiring analysis of factors apart from those examined here, and providing an 
interesting puzzle regarding the strong I-1 finding (versus the strong P-1 findings with the 
Middle East generally).  It should be noted here that, excluding the findings for S-Scores 
from the I-1 model in Table 10, price of oil from the I-1 model in Table 12, policy 
reciprocation and the price of oil from the I-1 model in Table 13, and I-1 and continuity 
variables in Table 14, no major differences are found from Tables 9-11 to Tables 12-14. 
Individual Presidential Analyses 
Each president comes into the White House holding preferences, beliefs, and 
ideas independent from other presidents, but do these psychological factors matter more 
for some than it does for others regarding foreign policy actions?  To explore this 
question, this section looks at each president separately in order to see how the influence 
of beliefs differs from one president to the other regarding influence over U.S. policy 
actions in the Middle East. 
Ronald Reagan 
 I report OLS regression results for Ronald Reagan in Table 15.  The average S-
Scores between the U.S. and Middle Eastern states yields the only significant coefficient 
for Reagan on either the P-1 or I-1 model (P-1: b=-19.165, t=-2.760, prob<.05; I-1: b=-
18.902, t=-2.741, prob<.05).  Interestingly, this indicates a strong, negative relationship 
between average dyadic S-Scores and the dependent variable.  Thus, under Reagan, the 
more the U.S. “agrees” with Middle Eastern states in terms of its alliance portfolio, the 
more conflictual her actions are.  Additionally, coefficients for all other variables fail to  
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Table 14: U.S. Action toward Israel without S-Scores Regression  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 





 b t  b t 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept 0.298 0.382  0.118 0.152 
Previous Actions by the U.S. Toward 
Israel [+] 0.088 1.447  0.100 1.653* 
Previous Actions From Israel 
Toward the U.S. [+] 
0.022 0.470  0.016 0.347 
Nature of the Political Universe (P-
1) [+] 
0.495 1.116  --- --- 
Strategic Preferences (I-1) [+] --- ---  0.735 2.029** 
Unemployment Rate [-] 0.102 1.239  0.078 0.950 
Public support for the president [-] -0.010 -1.165  -0.010 -1.144 
Price of Oil [-] -0.001 -0.170  0.004 0.060 
________________________________________________________________________ 
N 282 282 
R² .045 .055 
Adjusted R² .024 .034 
*prob < .10 
**prob < .05 
 
reach conventional levels of statistical significance on both psychological models (P-1 
and I-1).  Specifically, Reagan’s psychological beliefs, reciprocation against Middle 
Eastern actions, and policy continuity, which are all significant in the general model 
against all Middle Eastern states, had no significant effect on foreign policy actions 
toward the Middle East under Reagan’s watch.  Whether it was heavy delegation to 
activist subordinates, a preoccupation with Central America and the Soviet Union, a 
crafty and unpredictable decision-making process, or something else altogether, Reagan’s 
models do not appear to capture the dynamics influencing U.S. foreign policy during the 
Reagan administration. 
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 Table 15: Ronald Reagan Administration toward all Middle East States Regression 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 





 b t  b t 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept -2.209 -1.366  -2.641 -1.589 
Previous Actions by the U.S. Toward 
Middle Eastern States [+] 0.063 0.593  0.073 0.692 
Previous Actions From Middle East 
States Toward the U.S. [+] 
0.095 0.808  0.082 0.699 
Nature of the Political Universe (P-
1) [+] 
0.562 0.717  --- --- 
Strategic Preferences (I-1) [+] --- ---  0.794 1.249 
Unemployment Rate [-] 0.048 0.350  0.039 0.293 
Public support for the president [-] 0.004 0.227  0.007 0.368 
Price of Oil [-] 0.004 0.361  0.006 0.579 
Average S-Scores between the U.S. 
and all Middle Eastern States [+] -19.165 -2.760**  -18.902 -2.741** 
________________________________________________________________________ 
N 97 97 
R² .157 .165 
Adjusted R² .090 .099 
**prob < .05 
George H.W. Bush 
 OLS results for Bush the elder are reported in Table 16.  On the P-1 model, the 
coefficient for image of the political universe (P-1) is positive and moderately strong 
(b=2.107, t=1.873, prob<.10), indicating that Bush’s perception of the “other” has an 
influence on U.S. actions in the Middle East.  Specifically, when Bush, Sr. sees the 
general political universe as cooperative, U.S. actions toward the Middle East tend to be 
more cooperative.  Conversely, when Bush, Sr. sees the “other” as conflict-minded, the 
U.S. tends to act likewise.  Also, on the I-1 model, the public support variable yields a 
negative and moderately strong coefficient (b=-.032, t=-1.767, prob<.10).  Thus, as 
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public support for Bush increases, U.S. actions in the Middle East become more 
conflictual.  This gives support to the Ostrom and Job hypothesis noted above.  No other 
variable yields a statistically significant coefficient for George H.W. Bush on either the 
P-1 or I-1 models.  As with Reagan, it is interesting that neither policy continuity nor 
reciprocation play significant roles for H.W. Bush. 









 b t  b t 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept 3.454 1.090  5.104 1.621 
Previous Actions by the U.S. Toward 
Middle Eastern States [+] 0.064 0.370  0.160 0.945 
Previous Actions From Middle East 
States Toward the U.S. [+] 0.085 0.522  0.105 0.621 
Nature of the Political Universe (P-
1) [+] 2.107 1.873*  --- --- 
Strategic Preferences (I-1) [+] --- ---  0.876 0.858 
Unemployment Rate [-] -0.355 -1.201  -0.459 -1.539 
Public support for the president [-] -0.028 -1.551  -0.032 -1.767* 
Price of Oil [-] -0.015 -0.425  -0.034 -1.010 
Average S-Scores between the U.S. 
and all Middle Eastern States [+] 
0.473 0.332  -0.089 -0.062 
________________________________________________________________________ 
N 50 50 
R² .345 .301 
Adjusted R² .233 .182 
*prob < .10 
 
Bill Clinton 
 OLS Results for Bill Clinton are shown in Table 17.  In both models assessed for 
Clinton (P-1 and I-1), the coefficient for policy continuity by the U.S. is positive and 
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 strong (P-1: b=.440, t=3.894, prob<.001; I-1: b=.423, t=3.642, prob<.001).  This 
indicates that foreign policy actions during Clinton’s terms in office were strongly 
affected by policies already in place.  Also, the coefficients for the average S-Scores 
between the U.S. and Middle Eastern states are positive and moderately significant in 
both models (P-1: b=5.150, t=1.685, prob<.10; I-1: b=5.619, t=1.820, prob<.10).  As 
opposed to the negative, somewhat counterintuitive findings with Reagan on this 
variable, it appears that during Clinton’s time in office, when Middle Eastern states are 
more allied with the U.S., she acts more cooperatively toward them.  No other 
coefficients were significant in either model for Clinton, indicating that both his beliefs 
and reciprocation against actions by Middle Eastern states were not significant factors for 
Clinton. 
George W. Bush 
 OLS results for George W. Bush are shown in Table 18.  For Bush the younger, 
no statistically significant coefficients are found for any variable examined on either 
model.  Thus, variables not examined here seem to explain most of the variation in U.S. 
policy outcomes toward the Middle East during George W. Bush’s first term.16  As with 
Reagan and Clinton, George W. Bush’s general operational code beliefs toward the 
international environment do not play a statistically significant role regarding U.S. policy 
actions in the Middle East.  Though there is no evident reason for the insignificant P-1 
finding, the lack of findings for the policy continuity and reciprocation variables may 
stem from the “war on terror,” the efforts of which would be seriously hampered by an 
overly predictable, reactive United States (of which the reciprocation and continuity 
variables could be seen as proxies). 
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Table 17: Bill Clinton Administration toward All Middle East States Regression 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 





 b t  b t 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept -0.615 -0.233  0.238 0.090 
Previous Actions by the U.S. 
Toward Middle Eastern States [+] 0.440 3.894***  0.423 3.642*** 
Previous Actions From Middle East 
States Toward the U.S. [+] 
0.217 1.497  0.236 1.599 
Nature of the Political Universe (P-
1) [+] 
0.825 1.316  --- --- 
Strategic Preferences (I-1) [+] --- ---  -0.532 -0.858 
Unemployment Rate [-] 0.323 1.580  0.341 1.629 
Public support for the president [-] 0.015 0.641  0.013 0.555 
Price of Oil [-] -0.004 -0.114  -0.005 -0.149 
Average S-Scores between the U.S. 
and all Middle Eastern States [+] 5.150 1.685*  5.619 1.820* 
________________________________________________________________________ 
N 97 97 
R² .473 .467 
Adjusted R² .431 .425 
*prob <.10 
***prob <.001 
U.S. Actions toward the Middle East Excluding George H.W. Bush 
 Following the individual presidential analyses, it becomes apparent that the 
significant coefficient for presidential image of the other in the international environment 
(P-1) does not hold from one president to another.  In fact, it is only moderately 
significant for one president: George H.W. Bush.  Therefore, in order to test the 
competing explanations of whether H.W. Bush’s score inflated findings in the general 
models, or whether the lack of P-1 findings for individual presidents illustrates a 
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 b t  b t 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept 1.045 0.351  3.130 1.173 
Previous Actions by the U.S. Toward 
Middle Eastern States [+] 0.196 0.881  0.147 0.655 
Previous Actions From Middle East 
States Toward the U.S. [+] 0.162 0.685  0.214 0.893 
Nature of the Political Universe (P-
1) [+] 1.223 1.304  --- --- 
Strategic Preferences (I-1) [+] --- ---  0.079 0.166 
Unemployment Rate [-] -0.170 -0.593  -0.361 -1.424 
Public support for the president [-] -0.005 -0.258  -0.011 -0.621 
Price of Oil [-] -0.013 -0.279  -0.023 -0.477 
________________________________________________________________________ 
N 42 42 
R² .309 .275 
Adjusted R² .187 .148 
 
statistical power issue, P-1 models were re-run for all Middle Eastern countries excluding 
George H.W. Bush.  Results for these regressions are given in Table 19.  Model A 
examines the Reagan and Clinton administrations alone, as it includes the S-Scores which 
require the exclusion of George W. Bush from the sample.  Based on this model, as the 
coefficient for image of the other is insignificant, it may initially seem as if George H.W.  
Bush was, indeed, inflating the coefficient for the model as a whole.  However, Bush the 
younger was excluded from this model as well, leading to a decreased level of 
generalizability and statistical power in Model A’s find ings.  P-1 findings from Model B 
in Table 19 (which includes George W. Bush though still excluding his father), however, 
indicates a significant influence of P-1 on the dependent variable of U.S. policy actions 
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Table 19: Influences on U.S. action toward All Middle East States Regression 




 Model A (Including S-Scores) Model B  
 b t  b t 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept -0.025 -0.020  -0.310 -0.396 
Previous Actions by the U.S. 
Toward Middle Eastern States [+] 0.339 4.353***  0.335 4.740*** 
Previous Actions From Middle East 
States Toward the U.S. [+] 
0.225 2.401**  0.222 2.625** 
Nature of the Political Universe (P-
1) [+] 
0.728 1.431  0.849 1.943* 
Unemployment Rate [-] -0.041 -0.416  0.024 0.302 
Public support for the president [-] -0.001 -0.083  -0.020 -0.219 
Price of Oil [-] 0.007 0.789  0.009 1.166 
Average S-Scores between the U.S. 
and all Middle Eastern States [+] 0.431 0.598  --- --- 
________________________________________________________________________ 
N 193 234 
R² .277 .283 
Adjusted R² .249 .264 
*prob < .10 
**prob < .05 
***prob < .001 
 
toward the Middle East (b=.849, t=1.943, prob=.053).  As the S-Scores seem to have only 
a negligible impact on Model A, it can be safely assumed that the presidential image (P-
1) finding holds for U.S. presidents even when Bush the elder is not taken into account.  
Thus, the lack of significant findings regarding the P-1 variable for individual presidents 
seems to point to the explanation that this is a statistical power issue. 
U.S. Actions toward the Middle East Excluding Bill Clinton 
 Similar to the above concerns with George H.W. Bush, there is the possibility, 
following from the strong coefficients for Clinton’s individual regression regarding 
 47 
policy continuity, the possibility that Clinton’s time in office inflated the overall 
coefficient for this variable when looking at all presidents together.  Thus, both P-1 
models were re-run for Clinton both including and excluding S-Scores (the extremely 
weak influence of instrumental preferences in Clinton’s I-1 model makes its inclusion 
superfluous).  Results in Table 20 show that the exclusion of Clinton still yields a 
significant coefficient on the policy continuity variable in Model B (b=.162, t=2.094, 
prob<.05).  Though this coefficient is not significant in Model A, again, George W. Bush 
is not included, and a lack of statistical power likely plays a role toward explaining this 
finding.  Thus, policy continuity seems to matter for U.S. action abroad, even when 
extreme cases (such as Clinton) are not examined. 
U.S. Actions toward the Middle East Excluding the Policy Continuity Variable 
 One final problem that will be discussed here involves interpreting the role of the 
realist, reciprocation variable.  When the policy continuity variable (lagged U.S. actions 
toward the Middle East) is excluded, the reciprocation variable consistently provides the 
strongest coefficient of all variables examined, though it actually loses significance in the 
models from Tables 10 and 13.  As an example of this, Table 21 examines P-1 models on 
all Middle Eastern states with both the inclusion and exclusion of S-Scores.  Coefficients 
for previous actions by Middle Eastern states (reciprocation) here are positive and 
extremely significant at the .001, two-tailed significance level (Model A: b=.419, 
t=6.015, prob<.001; Model B: b=.425, t=6.646, prob<.001).17  Though models excluding  
the reciprocation variable alone yield stronger t-values than those excluding the 
continuity variable alone, the differences aren’t that big,18 seeming to indicate that both 
of these variables are important regarding their influence on the dependent variable of 
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Table 20: Influences on U.S. Action toward All Middle East States Regression (Bill 
Clinton’s terms excluded for both, George W. Bush also excluded in Model A) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Model A (Including S-Scores) Model B  
 b t  b t 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept 0.582 0.540  -0.206 -0.254 
Previous Actions by the U.S. 
Toward Middle Eastern States [+] 0.133 1.520  0.162 2.094** 
Previous Actions From Middle East 
States Toward the U.S. [+] 0.122 1.281  0.135 1.589 
Nature of the Political Universe (P-
1) [+] 1.201 1.998**  1.110 2.396** 
Unemployment Rate [-] -0.116 -1.087  -0.097 -1.165 
Public support for the president [-] -0.009 -0.817  -0.009 -1.208 
Price of Oil [-] 0.012 1.395  0.014 2.053** 
Average S-Scores between the U.S. 
and all Middle Eastern States [+] .845 1.453  --- --- 
________________________________________________________________________ 
N 145 186 
R² .158 .179 
Adjusted R² .115 .151 
**prob < .05 
 
U.S. policy actions toward Middle Eastern states.  One explanation here may be that the 
Pearson’s correlation between the two lagged independent variables (the reciprocation 
and continuity variables) is fairly high (.574), indicating that some degree of 
multicollinearity is affecting results.  Though these two variables clearly measure 
different things, they are also closely related theoretically and empirically (as the results  
of Table 21 show).  Therefore, it is not completely farfetched to imagine that one of these 
independent variables could artificially deflate the influence of the other.  The only  
reason lags are included in this study at all is to explicitly demonstrate causality.  In a 
world where this was not an issue, the reciprocation variable would not be lagged at all 
(as it is likely that actions from the Middle East often lead to U.S. responses in the same 
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month or vice versa).  However, though lags may be an imperfect solution, they help to 
explore causality, and are thus useful for this project.  Thus, I will treat the reciprocation 
variable here as significantly related to the dependent variable, though it is the reader’s 
prerogative to accept or dispute this interpretation. 
Table 21: Influences on U.S. Action toward All Middle East States Regression 




 Model A (Including S-Scores) Model B  
 b t  b t 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Intercept 0.428 0.516  0.001 0.001 
Previous Actions From Middle East 
States Toward the U.S. [+] 0.419 6.015***  0.425 6.646*** 
Nature of the Political Universe (P-
1) [+] 0.968 2.167**  0.976 2.503** 
Unemployment Rate [-] -0.024 -0.552  0.035 0.496 
Public support for the president [-] -0.007 -0.792  -0.008 -1.032 
Price of Oil [-] 0.005 0.671  0.010 1.453 
Average S-Scores between the U.S. 
and all Middle Eastern States [+] 
0.738 1.357  --- --- 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
N 240 281 
   
R² .206 .209 
   
Adjusted R² .185 .194 
   
**prob < .05 




The major findings from this project are that policy continuity (previous actions 
by the U.S. toward the Middle East-hypothesis H3), policy reciprocation (previous 
actions by Middle Eastern states toward the U.S.-hypothesis H4), and presidential 
operational code beliefs in the form of perceived image of the international environment 
(P-1-hypothesis H1) yield strong, positive influences on U.S. foreign policy actions 
toward the Middle East.  These findings provide support for structural claims that U.S. 
foreign policy moves logically from one point in time to another and that the actions of 
other states condition the actions the U.S. will subsequently take.  However, findings also 
support the agency argument that a president’s beliefs regarding the nature of the “other” 
play an important role in determining U.S. foreign policy. 
Regarding the psychological variables in this study, a few further observations 
should be noted, as this is the previously unexplored component of, and primary impetus 
behind this project.  First, the operational code, though less than perfect, is given some 
strong face validity here, as findings support the hypothesized expectations for the image 
of the other (P-1) variable.  Thus, the underlying constructs tapped by the operational 
code may provide greater nuance to broader theories investigating both conflictual and 
cooperative outcomes resulting from U.S. foreign policy decisions.  Secondly, the 
components of the operational code assessed in this study focus on the general 
international environment (not just the Middle East), providing proxies that, at a given 
time, assess a U.S. president’s beliefs of the international setting as a whole.  
Nonetheless, one of the two indices examined here was able to explain a significant 
degree of the variation of U.S. foreign policy actions toward a specific region of the 
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world.  This shows that the general image of the other (as measured by the operational 
code) is fundamental to a leader’s perception of nearly all other actors in the international 
arena, and as these results show, this perception colors a great deal of the influence that 
U.S. presidents have over world affairs.  This finding may have theoretical, as well as 
methodological implications for future studies on image theory. 
More specifically, what the psychological results of this study show is that, at a 
given time, the friendlier a U.S. president perceives the general international environment 
to be, the more cooperative the U.S. will be toward the Middle East, whereas conflict 
toward this region follows more hostile perceptions of the outside world by the president.  
This provides large-n, quantitative support to perception of threat19 (Walt, 1987; Croci, 
2003; Leffler, 2003; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, and Lahav, 2005) and image theories 
(Cottam, 1992; Hermann and Fischerkeller, 1995; Herrmann and Keller, 2004).  Though 
this finding makes sense, and was, in fact, expected by hypothesis H1, support was not 
found for hypothesis H2, regarding the influence of conflictual versus cooperative 
strategic orientations of U.S. presidents.  In other words, we find here that a president’s 
perception of others’ intentions is more important than his personal preferences 
regarding U.S. foreign policy action in the Middle East.  Why is it, then, that images 
matter and presidential preferences do not regarding Middle Eastern policy events? 
Perhaps the easiest answer to the above question is that, in a world of power 
politics, personal preferences may play a subordinate role to that of more pressing 
influences.  Holding appropriate images of one’s opponents are critically important in 
foreign affairs, as this affects prospects for survival (even if these perceptions are wrong), 
and as such, it is not surprising that these perceptions influence policy in important ways.  
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However, though one’s personal strategic preferences may be important and may matter 
in certain instances, presidents may simply not be willing or able to exert the necessary 
political capital required to realize broad strategic preferences on a large scale, due to this 
preference’s relative unimportance in a world where your priority is to survive.  Related 
to this, Herrmann and Keller (2004), following analysis of survey results from 514 U.S. 
leaders, argue that: 
. . . perceptions of both intentions and culture do affect strategic decisions in 
systematic ways.  American elites’ perceptions that a country harbors hostile 
intentions . . . generally leads to an increased willingness to use force and to 
contain the target state, along with a decreased preference for engagement 
strategies. (p. 577) 
 
They further argue that dispositional factors do not play a significant role in strategic 
decision-making.  This focus on perceptions of the other as driving forces is also at the 
root of Jervis’s (1976) work on misperception, where beliefs regarding others’ intentions 
(even when they are wrong) affect foreign policy in important ways, potentially 
contributing to externalities such as arms races.  Thus, it is unlikely that these authors 
would be surprised by the results of this study. 
Secondary findings show that Israel, not surprisingly, differs from other Middle 
Eastern states regarding U.S. foreign policy actions, and the degree of influence by the 
continuity, reciprocation, and image perception variables toward producing these actions.  
What is particularly interesting here, however, is that in the Israel-only model including 
George W. Bush’s scores, the strategic preferences variable (I-1) yields a positive and 
significant influence on the dependent variable, whereas the image of the other variable 
(P-1) is not significant on any model examining Israel alone; the opposite of findings 
from the general models (looking at all Middle East states).  Though this seems strange at 
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first, perhaps these divergent findings are really not that surpris ing, and can actually tell 
us something about the role of images versus preferences in dyadic relationships of 
fundamentally different characters in the international system.  If Israel is truly an 
unequivocal ally, and there is little to no chance that the U.S. will engage in conflict with 
her, then perhaps realist-based theories lose their explanatory usefulness.  Following the 
discussion above, the image variable may matter regarding the Middle East generally 
because it is able to tap into realist notions of survival.  The lack of influence by the 
image variable toward Israel, however, may be due in part to a lack of threat provided by 
Israel toward the U.S.  As U.S. presidents typically do not see Israel in the same way that 
it views other countries, the president’s image of the general international environment 
will differ significantly from the image it holds of Israel (which was not measured here), 
and in this sense the non-findings for this general variable in the Israel-only model are 
unsurprising. 
Whereas allowing overt personal preferences (when not focused purely on 
maximizing power) to influence foreign policy can be dangerous, and is thus avoided in 
the setting of traditional power politics (explaining why this variable is not significant in 
the general models), the strong connections built up between Israel and the U.S. may 
provide a buffer to this danger.  U.S. actions toward Israel are, on average, very positive, 
and it is highly unlikely that U.S.-Israeli relations will be strained beyond repair by any 
given U.S. Administration, and this allows presidential preferences (based on the limited 
range of policy actions available here) to be reflected in U.S. policy toward Israel.  For 
example, if a president prefers conflict at a given point in time, the U.S. may censure 
Israel for not making realistic movement toward withdrawing troops from occupied 
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territory in the West Bank.  Conversely, if a president prefers cooperation at some point, 
the U.S. may be more inclined to give Israel a few more advanced, “bunker buster” 
bombs for potential use against nuclear threats in nearby states.  Whatever the action, 
however, the U.S. is not going to see Israel as a threat, and general foreign policy here 
will be, on aggregate, more positive than negative.  Thus, to reiterate, for modern U.S. 
Presidents, the significant finding for the image (P-1) variable toward all Middle Eastern 
countries seems to be more strictly based on realism (focusing on perceptions of threat 
from the “other”), whereas the strategic preferences variable may have influence in 
situations where a real potential threat does not exist. 
Regarding individual presidents, psychological factors do not initially seem to 
play much of a role.  It is interesting that, despite significant findings for the general 
model regarding all Middle East states, image perception (P-1) only reaches significance 
for one president in the case of George Herbert Walker Bush, and even for him this is 
only a moderate finding.  Only when you step back and look at the big picture (with the 
increased sample size and statistical power associated with such) does the image of the 
political universe have a really strong impact on presidential foreign policy actions.  Each 
president yields a positive t-statistic at least approaching +1.0 on the image perception (P-
1) coefficient (it surpasses this benchmark for all presidents except Reagan), and this 
consistent level of unidirectional influence does not hold for any other variable examined 
(including the coefficients for lagged actions by the U.S. and by other states toward the 
U.S.).  Thus, presidential perceptions of the political universe appear to play an important 
role in foreign policy outcomes across presidents. 
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Regarding the idiosyncratic findings for individual presidents, Reagan is an 
interesting case, as his S-score coefficient is completely the opposite of what one might 
expect, and this cannot be easily explained.  For the U.S. to act in a more hostile nature 
toward states that hold alliances similar to itself and more cooperative toward those that 
do not is odd.  This finding may be the result of only having one S-Score per year, thus 
greatly reducing the ability of this variable to provide a nuanced explanation for alliance 
shifts within a given year.  Conversely, this finding may have something to do with the 
“Reagan paradox,” meaning that Reagan’s rhetoric, and perhaps even actions of a formal 
diplomatic variety, contrasted with his actions as president.  Having an “alliance” may 
not have meant for Reagan what it meant to other presidents. Perhaps Reagan was alone 
among those examined here in believing that one should “keep his friends close, and his 
enemies closer,” signifying a realist underpinning to his foreign policy aimed at keeping 
all countries on their toes.  On the other hand, this may have had something to do with 
Reagan’s high degree of delegation of responsibilities to subordinates.  This, if true, 
would additionally make an accurate assessment of Reagan’s operational code difficult, 
as if Reagan only played a small role in speech construction, then his operational code 
may be difficult to realistically assess through his speeches.  Finally, this finding may 
simply be a statistical anomaly.  Whatever the reason, if the findings here do, indeed, 
reflect reality under Reagan’s two terms, than this is a mystery that requires further 
exploration. 
H.W. Bush’s image of the political universe (P-1), though modestly influential in 
itself, seems to play a much more important role as an influence on foreign policy actions 
for him than it does for the other presidents examined here.  Why is this?  One 
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explanation may be that Bush simply had more foreign policy experience than any other 
president examined coming into office, being a former Ambassador to the United 
Nations, Chief of the U. S. Liaison Office in China, head of the C.I.A., and serving eight 
years as vice-president for Reagan.  Thus, one might expect that Bush, first off, would 
have a greater interest in foreign affairs, which is hypothesized elsewhere to have an 
influence on outcomes (Hermann, 1984).  Secondly, Bush may be expected to exhibit a 
greater degree of comfort in dealing with foreign affairs than the others examined here, 
and thus be less hesitant to have his own views dictate policy.  Though the elder Bush 
was one of the less ideological, more consensus-minded presidents examined in this 
study, it appears regarding foreign policy actions that “conviction” and rhetoric may not 
necessarily translate into foreign policy influence.  Whatever the reason, it appears that, 
rather than objective “reality” (assessed through the reciprocation variable), Bush’s 
perception of reality (P-1) affected U.S. actions abroad. 
Also under Bush, Sr.’s watch, public support is somewhat negatively related to 
U.S. foreign policy actions.  It appears that the greater the degree of U.S. public support 
exhibited toward H.W. Bush, the more negative U.S. actions become, and vice versa.  
This seems to reflect Ostrom and Job’s (1986) suggestion that presidents may be more 
inclined to use force abroad when public opinion is higher, meaning that this is the 
president’s automatic preference, irrespective of his personal “beliefs.”  It may well be 
that H.W. Bush saw increased levels of public support as an opportunity to exploit a 
“rally ‘round the flag” effect.  If this were the case, however, regarding the 1992 election, 
the economy trumped the effects of this phenomenon.  More likely, this finding seems to 
 57 
follow Bush’s actions toward Iraq during the first Persian Gulf War, as strong levels of 
public support correspond with high levels of conflict in the Middle East. 
Regarding Bill Clinton, he seems the most constrained of all the presidents 
examined here (in terms of foreign policy influence).  The previous month’s actions by 
the United States (policy continuity) dictate U.S. action at a given time for Clinton to an 
extremely high degree.  This, along with his moderately significant S-Score finding 
(indicating a kind of automatic action regarding allies and adversaries), is not incredibly 
surprising given the constraints placed on Clinton by the Congress during the gist of his 
time in office, even in foreign affairs.  For example, Clinton was opposed by Congress 
regarding his attempted interventions in the Balkans (Sobel, 2001), and he was denied 
trade promotion authority twice.  This, along with Clinton’s overriding interest in 
domestic affairs, may have contributed to his weakness in personally affecting general 
foreign policy. 
Regressions examining George W. Bush’s time in office indicate no significant 
coefficients on any variable examined.  If those variables examined here do not matter so 
much regarding U.S. actions in the Middle East, what else might be explaining these 
outcomes?  Recent examinations have found that foreign policy advisors have played a 
critical role in influencing foreign policy, at least in the first George W. Bush 
Administration (Mann, 2004; Woodward, 2004).  Further, Bush himself often argued, 
when running for election in 2000, that his lack of foreign policy experience would not be 
a factor as he would rely heavily on his “advisors and their long record of experience” 
(Mann, 2004, p. 255) in the international relations realm.  This extreme degree of 
delegation harkens back to Reagan’s time in office, and, as mentioned before, may also 
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help to explain why the psychological variables for Reagan are so weak.  Apart from this, 
perhaps the previous actions by the U.S. or by other states toward the U.S. do not dictate 
what the U.S. does exactly in the Middle East following from two major events under 
George W. Bush’s watch: the aftereffects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the war in Iraq. 
The war on terror following 9/11 has necessarily kept U.S. actions somewhat 
unpredictable, particularly in the Middle East, so as to keep Islamic militants on their 
toes.  Further, U.S. actions were generally conflictual in areas where terrorists were 
suspected of being trained and sheltered, both after 9/11 and during the war in Iraq.  
Thus, the fear of future hostile activity, as opposed to actual hostile actions by enemies of 
the U.S., would be the pre-requisite for hostile action by the U.S., minimizing the effect 
of both the lagged independent variables in this study. 
On a more general note, this study has explored influences on foreign policy 
outcomes in ways that have been either underplayed or ignored previously.  Biases 
toward studying the “use of force” and the occurrence of war seem to reinforce the 
classical realist and psychoanalytic framework of individuals as being interested only in 
power, exploitation, and violence.  However, it has been suggested elsewhere that 
cooperation may be critical to understanding international outcomes (Krasner, 1983; 
O’Neil, Balsinger, and VanDeveer, 2004).  This study, though not dismissive of the 
realist claim, supports the latter notion, and uses a continuum that explores both the 
negative and positive, conflictual and cooperative sides of psychology and policy 
outcomes.  As such, I hope to demonstrate that though conflict and violence seem an 
indispensable component of international behavior, this does not exhaust the spectrum of 
important policy actions and outcomes.  Though there is good reason to focus on conflict 
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as a means to understand, and thus hopefully reduce, the frequency and scale of conflict, 
that is no reason to neglect the study of positive actions, which could yield similar results. 
It should also be noted that though it may be encouraging to advocates of 
individual agency that the image variable seems to be important in this study, the 
psychological variables examined here tap into only a limited domain of psychological 
phenomena.  The examination of motives, traits, specific personality types, the effects of 
crises, levels of presidential interest in foreign policy, and the effects of advisors, to name 
a few, are factors that should eventually be integrated into this kind of analysis to provide 
a fuller understanding of presidential decision making and influence.  Of course, other 
factors influencing U.S. policy actions apart from those related directly to narrow, 
executive influence should be taken into account as well, and the literature on the use of 
force, bureaucratic politics, political economy, as well as examinations of constructivist 
and traditional realist factors should not be ignored.  Again, the purpose of this study was 
not to be an exhaustive examination of factors influencing U.S. foreign policy (that 
would likely be impossible anyway), but to argue that the U.S. president matters, and that 
psychological variables exist that can tap into these factors that have long been ignored in 
much mainstream, quantitative research in this realm. 
Ultimately, findings here reinforce an often used qualification in political 
psychology studies: an individual’s psychology matters, but this is not all there is to the 
story of international political action.  Specifically, though external events and the 
necessity of policy continuity may largely tie one’s hands when making foreign policy 
decisions, psychology may be critical to understanding responses to situations that are 
ambiguous or neutral (Direnzo, 1974), where the president has a strong interest or 
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experience in foreign policy (Hermann, 1984), when he possesses a high degree of 
charisma or prestige (Halverson, Halladay, Kazama and Quiñonez, 2004; Mondak, 
Lewis, Sides, Kang, and Long, 2004) or when Congressional and public support for the 
president are highest (McCormick and Wittkopf, 1990; Risse-Kappan, 1991; Meernick, 
1993; Collier and Sullivan, 1995; Sobel, 2001).20  Additionally, as this study shows, 
when looking at the big picture of U.S. political outcomes over a long time period, the 
importance of an individual’s perceptions of “the other” comes through, even when 
taking more important variables (such as policy continuity and policy reciprocation) into 
account.  To sum up, Randall Schweller (1998) argues that: 
. . . any interpretation of the origins of war must. . .include the particular interests 
and goals of the major actors as specific causes that supplement the more general 
causes and therefore provide greater determinateness to the explanation . . . (p.4) 
 
Though I would qualify this by changing “war” to “foreign actions,” this study supports 
the inclusion of individual agency in future analyses studying the determinants of U.S. 
foreign policy, and in the process hopes to provide those interested with a potentially 
very useful method of doing so. 
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NOTES 
1 Levels of presidential “charisma,” the occurrence of major crises, level of presidential 
interest/experience with foreign policy, and pre/post-Cold War environment, for example, 
could be expected to play an important role regarding the dependent variable.  However, 
either a lack of available measures, or scores differing on only one president (Reagan on 
the Cold War measure) necessitate these variables being excluded from this study. 
 
2 Though a Pearson correlation coefficient of only .388 is found between the image of the 
other (P-1) and instrumental preferences (I-1) variables, weak, often counterintuitive 
findings result when both psychological variables are used in the same regression model. 
 
3 Although I tried to read through most speeches in which foreign policy would be 
referred, speeches generally were not read if they seemed to focus on non-foreign policy 
issues, and this process may have left out a number of relevant speech acts. 
 
4 Of course, the influence of speechwriters may vary from one President to another.  For 
instance, Ronald Reagan, who is perceived to have delegated a great degree of 
responsibility to subordinates, would likely have had less influence on what he actually 
said than a president more interested in micromanaging his actions, such as Richard 
Nixon or Lyndon Johnson.  However, for this study, it will be taken as a given that each 
president equally represents his operational code beliefs through his speeches.  This is 
done as the task of ranking presidential micromanagement over speechwriting is outside 
the realm of this study, but this issue is one worth exploring, and may help to shed added 
light on the empirical results here, specifically for individual presidents. 
 
5 This was rarely done, but necessary, particularly in early months of a given Presidency, 
where foreign policy is often not the focus of any given speech until late February or 
March. 
 
6 Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995) define “strategic images” as a “subjective cognitive 
construct or mental representation of another actor in the political world” (p. 415).  This 
is associated with the “spiral model” of interaction and was a popular concept used to 
understand U.S./Soviet interactions during the Cold War.  Cottam (1992) echoes this, 
describing images as heuristic devices that “influence the selection of tactics and 
instruments used in the pursuit of policy goals” (p. 126). 
 
7 Middle Eastern States included here (as named in the Levant Data Set) are Afghanistan, 
Algeria, Al Qaeda, “Arab countries,” “Arab Media,” the Baath Party, Arab League, Arab 
League Secretary-General, Bahrain, Egypt, Gulf Cooperative Council, Iran, Iraq, "Islam," 
"Muslim," Israel, "Jew," Jordan, Kurds, Kuwait, Libya, Lebanon, "Islamic Jihad," 
"Militant Islamic Group," Morocco, "Moslim," Osama bin Laden, "Islamic Conference  
Organization," Oman, OPEC, Pakistan, Palestine, “Pan-Arab workers,” Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. 
 
8 Again, however, this was rarely done due to the vast amount of available data. 
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9 One might presume, following these hypothetical expectations, that unemployment and 
presidential support are independent of one another and should not exhibit any 
relationship with one another.  However, a bivariate correlation was run on these two 
variables from the data in this study, and a strong, negative relationship is found 
(Pearson’s correlation=-.417, prob<.001).  This is not incredibly surprising (i.e. higher 
unemployment leads to decreased support of the president), but raises questions regarding 
expectations from the general use of force literature, as increases in both of these 
variables are expected to lead to the increased use of force abroad. 
 
10 This score is calculated from a 4X4 table, where alliances are rated as either 1 (defense 
pact), 2 (neutrality pact), 3 (entente), and 4 (no alliance). 
 
11 Analyses including the George W. Bush presidency are included in this study, but 
obviously without S-Scores.  Further, this data is not as nuanced as the event data, as only 
states are included, and thus interactions with Palestinians, the Arab League, Jews, 
Kurds, militant Islamic groups and others go unmeasured. 
 
12 Though not included in Table format here, on the P-1 index (assessing presidential 
image of the “other”), the presidents examined here as a whole yield a z-score of .54 
against a broad sample of world leaders and a z-score of -.17 against a sample of post-
World War II U.S. presidents.  Thus, the psychological data drawn from the sample of 
speeches assessed here appears to measure up fairly closely with that of other U.S. 
presidents generally.  Further, U.S. presidents generally appear to see the world in more 
friendly terms than the average world leader. 
 
13 However, the S-Scores ANOVA finding does not factor in George W. Bush, while 
George H.W. Bush and Clinton’s scores are fairly similar, making this finding 
questionable. 
 
14 Two-tailed tests are used here to provide more confident results than one-tailed tests 
would yield.  Though the .05 significance level is used here to indicate “strong 
significance,” findings at the .10 level are also noted. 
 
15 Recall that though the event data is specific to the Middle East, the operational code 
data is very general, regarding presidential references to any foreign state or actor. 
 
16 It would be interesting to test S-Scores for Bush to see if this has an impact on 
outcomes as they do for Reagan and Clinton, but again, no such data were available at the 
time this was written. 
 
17 Other models were also run here to more fully explore this problem, but results were 
not included above to keep the discussion section from getting too unwieldy.  First, 
models were run exactly as in Table 21, but looking only at non-Israel Middle Eastern 
states (examining the possibility that the exclusion of Israel from analysis eliminates the 
influence of the reciprocation variable following the weak findings for the lagged non-
Israel Middle Eastern actions variable in Tables 10 and 13).  Results here are similar to 
those from Table 21, as previous actions by non-Israel Middle Eastern states yield a 
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strong, significant coefficient (Model A (With S-Scores): b=.340, t=4.798, prob<.001; 
Model B (Without S-Scores): b=.349, t=5.296, prob<.001).  This gives support to the 
notion that multicollinearity may be at play between the policy continuity and 
reciprocation variables.  Also, models were examined against all Middle Eastern states 
and non-Israel Middle Eastern states excluding both the policy continuity variable and 
data from the Clinton Administration years (following from the discussion surrounding 
Table 20).  Results here show that the model excluding Clinton for all Middle Eastern 
states still yields a strong coefficient for the previous actions by Middle Eastern states 
(reciprocation) variable (Model A (with S-Scores): b=.172, t=1.919, prob=.057; Model B 
(Without S-Scores): b=.204, t=2.594, prob<.05).  Further, taking Israel out as well only 
removes the influence of this variable when George W. Bush’s scores (and S-Scores) are 
removed as well (Model A (with S-Scores): b=.142, t=1.514, prob=.132; Model B 
(without S-Scores): b=.168, t=2.013, prob<.05).  Additionally, models were run for each 
president separately, exploring the effect of either the policy continuity variable or the 
reciprocation variable alone against all Middle Eastern states (S-Scores excluded for all 
models).  Results found that both of these factors were significant for Clinton at the .001, 
two-tailed level (reciprocation only: b=.670, t=6.217, prob<.001; continuity only:b=.604, 
t=7.423, prob<.001) while both were significant for George W. Bush at the .10, two-
tailed level (reciprocation only: b=.299, t=1.709, prob<.10; continuity only: b=.299, 
t=1.827, prob<.10).  Neither of these variables were significant at the .10, two-tailed 
level, for any other president in isolation.  This gives further weight to the argument that 
these variables are very closely related, and that multicollinearity may have been a factor. 
 
18 For example, in a model looking at the P-1 psychological variable excluding the 
reciprocation variable alone, the continuity variable yields a t-value of 7.595, which is not 
far from the value of 6.006 for the reciprocation variable in Table 21. 
 
19 Threat perception theories basically argue that threats (and the fear associated with 
such) often play a critical role in dictating individual thought and action.  This becomes 
non-rational, as it can lead to increased prejudice, intolerance, xenophobia, etc., and often 
trumps attempts to understand the “other,” and personal preferences in an unthreatened 
state, where objective assessments are more likely. 
 
20 It should be noted, however, that unreported analyses here on the interaction of public 
support variable with the psychological variables examined here seem to lay doubt on the 
final claim here. 
 64 
REFERENCES 
Allison, Graham T. and Morton H. Halperin. (1972). “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm 
and Some Policy Implications.” World Politics 23(Suppl.): 40-79. 
 
Astorino-Courtois, Allison. (1998). “Clarifying Decisions: Assessing the Impact of 
Decision Structures on Foreign Policy Choices During the 1979 Jordanian Civil 
War.” International Studies Quarterly 42(4): 733-57. 
 
Axelrod, Robert. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Berman, Larry. (2001). No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam. 
New York: The Free Press. 
 
Beschloss, Michael R. (1995). “George Bush: 1989-1993.” In Character Above All, ed. 
Robert A. Wilson. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Brener, Philip, Patrick J. Haney, and Walter Vanderbush. (2004). “Intermestic Interests 
and U.S. Policy Toward Cuba.” In The Domestic Sources of American Foreign 
Policy: Insights and Evidence, (4th Edition), ed. Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. 
McCormick. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Bush, George H.W. “Public Papers.” The George Bush Presidential Library and 
Museum. Accessed May 12, 2005. Available: 
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/paper.html 
 
Bush, George W. “Presidential News and Speeches.” The White House. Accessed May 
12, 2005. Available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/index.html 
 
Christensen, Eben J. and Stephen B. Redd. (2004). “Bureaucrats Versus the Ballot Box in 
Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Experimental Analysis of the Bureaucratic 
Politics Model and the Poliheuristic Theory.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(1): 
69-91. 
 
Clark, David H. (2001). “Trading Butter for Guns: Domestic Imperatives for Foreign 
Policy Substitution.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 54(5): 636-660. 
 
Clinton, Bill. “Online Library Archives.” Clinton Presidential Center. Accessed May 12, 
2005. Available: http://www.clintonfoundation.org/library_archives.htm 
 
Cohen, Jeffrey. (1995). “Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda.” American Journal 
of Political Science 39(1): 87-108. 
 
Collier, Kenneth and Terry Sullivan. (1995). “New Evidence Undercutting the Linkage of 




“Consumer Price Index.” The U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor and Statistics. 
Accessed September 10, 2005. Available: http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?cu 
 
Cottam, Martha. (1992). “The Carter Administration’s Policy toward Nicaragua: Images, 
Goals and Tactics.” Political Science Quarterly 107: 123-146. 
 
Croci, Osvaldo. (2003). “Italian Security after the Cold War.” Journal of Modern Italian 
Studies 8(2): 266-284. 
 
Dassel, Kurt. (1998). “Civilians, Soldiers, and Strife.” International Security 23(1): 107-
40. 
 
De Castro, Renato Cruz. (2000). “Whither Geoeconomics? Bureaucratic Inertia in U.S. 
Post-Cold War Policy Toward East Asia.” Asian Affairs: An American Review 26(4): 
201-21. 
 
Dille, Brian. (2000). “The Prepared and Spontaneous Remarks of Presidents Reagan and 
Bush: A Validity Comparison for At-a-Distance Measurements.” Political 
Psychology 21(3): 573-85. 
 
Drezner, Daniel. (2000).  “Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign 
Policy.” The American Journal of Political Science 44(4): 733-750.  
 
Fordham, Benjamin O. (1998). “The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: 
A Political Economy Model of U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994.” International 
Studies Quarterly 42: 567-590. 
 
Fordham, Benjamin O. (2002). “Domestic Politics, International Pressure, and the 
Allocation of American Cold War Military Spending.” Journal of Politics 64(1): 63-
89. 
 
George, Alexander. (1979). “The Causal Nexus between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-
Making Behavior: The “Operational Code” Belief System.” In Psychological Models 
of International Politics ed. Lawrence S. Falkowski. Boulder, CO: Westview. 
 
George, Alexander. (1980). Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective 
Use of Information and Advice. Boulder, CO: Westview. 
 
Greene, John Robert. (2000). The Presidency of George Bush. Kansas: The University 
Press of Kansas. 
 
Greenstein, Fred. (1992). “Can Personality Be Studied Systematically?” Political 
Psychology 13: 105-128. 
 
 66 
Greenstein, Fred. (2002). “The Qualitative Study of Presidential Personality.” In Political 
Leadership for a New Century: Personality and Behavior Among American Leaders, 
ed. Linda O. Valenty and Ofer Feldman. Westport, CT: Praeger. 
 
Halverson, S., C.L. Holladay, S.M. Kazama, and M.A. Quiñones. (2004). “Self-
Sacrificial Behavior in Crisis Situations: The Competing Roles of Behavioral and 
Situational Factors.” Leadership Quarterly 15: 263-75. 
 
Hermann, Margaret G. (1966). “Testing a Model of Psychological Stress.” Journal of 
Personality 34(3): 381-396. 
 
Hermann, Margaret G. (1980). “Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior Using the 
Personality Characteristics of Political Leaders.” International Studies Quarterly 24: 
7-46. 
 
Hermann, Margaret G. (1984). “Personality and Foreign Policy Making.” In Perceptions, 
Beliefs, and Foreign Policy Decision Making ed. Donald Sylvan and Steve Chan. 
New York: Praeger. 
 
Hermann, Margaret G. (2001). “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A 
Theoretical Framework.” International Studies Review 3(2): 47-81. 
 
Hermann, Margaret G. (2003). “Assessing Leadership Style: Trait Analysis.” In The 
Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders, ed. Jerrold Post. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
 
Herrmann, Richard K. (1984). “Perceptions and Foreign Policy Analysis.” In Foreign 
Policy Decision Making: Perception, Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence, ed. 
Donald A. Sylvan and Steve Chan. New York: Praeger. 
 
Herrmann, Richard K. and Michael P. Fischerkeller. (1995). “Beyond the Enemy Image 
and Spiral Model: Cognitive Strategic Research after the Cold War.” International 
Organization 49(3): 415-450. 
 
Herrmann, Richard K. and Jonathan W. Keller. (2004). “Beliefs, Values, and Strategic 
Choice: U.S. Leaders’ Decisions to Engage, Contain, and Use Force in an Era of 
Globalization.” The Journal of Politics 66(2): 557-580. 
 
Holland, Lauren. (1999). “The U.S. Decision to Launch Operation Desert Storm: A 
Bureaucratic Politics Analysis.” Armed Forces & Society 25(2): 219-43. 
 67 
 
Holsti, Ole. (1989). “Crisis Decision Making.” In Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, 
Vol. 1, ed. Philip Tetlock, Jo Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul Stern and Charles Tilly. 
New York: Oxford University Press.  
Hoyt, Paul D. (2000). “The ‘Rogue State’ Image in American Foreign Policy.” Global 
Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations 14(2): 297-311. 
 
Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber and Gallya Lahav. (2005). “Threat, 
Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies.” American Journal of Political 
Sicence 49(3): 593-609. 
 
“Introduction to Event Data Analysis.”  The University of Kansas Online.  Accessed 
April 13, 2005. Available: http://www.ku.edu/~keds/intro.html 
 
Jervis, Robert. (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Jhaveri, Nanya J. (2004). “Petroimperialism: US Oil Interests and the Iraq War.” 
Antipode 36(1): 2-11. 
 
Jones, Christopher M. (2001). “Roles, Politics, and the Survival of the V-22 Osprey.” 
Journal of Political and Military Sociology 29(1): 46-73. 
 
Kaarbo, J. and M.G. Hermann. (1998). “Leadership Styles of Prime Ministers: How 
Individual Differences Affect the Foreign Policy Making Process.” Leadership 
Quarterly 9: 243-63. 
 
“Keds Project Modified WEIS Event Codes.” From The Kansas Event Data System 
(KEDS). Accessed May 1, 2005. Available: 
http://www.ku.edu/~keds/data.dir/KEDS.WEIS.Codes.txt 
 
Krasner, Stephen. (1983). International Regimes. NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
“Labor Force Statistics-Historical.” U.S. Department of Labor-Bureau of Labor Statistics 
online. Accessed 2005, May 11. Available: 
http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpsatab1.htm 
 
Leffler, Melvyn P. (2003). “9/11 and the Past and Future of American Foreign Policy.” 
International Affairs 79(5): 1045-63. 
 
 68 
Leites, Nathan. (1951). The Operational Code of the Politburo. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Leng, Russell J. (1993). Interstate Crisis Behavior: 1816-1980: Realism vs. Reciprocity. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Leng, Russell J. (2004). “Escalation: Competing Perspectives and Empirical Evidence.” 
International Studies Review 6: 51-64. 
 
“Levant Data Set.”  From the University of Kansas web site.  Accessed May 1, 2005. 
Available: http://www.ku.edu/~keds/data.dir/levant.html, 4/13/05. 
 
Lindblom, Charles. (1977). Politics and Markets: The World’s Political-Economic 
Systems. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Lindley-French, Julian. (2003). “Common Interests and National Interests: Bridging the 
Values/Interests Gap.” American Foreign Policy Interests 25(1): 13-18. 
 
Mann, James. (2004). Rise of the Vulcans. New York: Penguin. 
 
Marfleet, B. Gregory. (2000). “The Operational Code of John F. Kennedy During the 
Cuban Missile Crisis: A Comparison of Public and Private Rhetoric.” Political 
Psychology 21(3): 545-558. 
 
Marshall, Bryan W. and Richard Pacelle. (2005). “Revisiting the Two Presidencies.” 
American Politics Research 33(1): 81-106. 
 
Marshall, Bryan W. (2003). “Presidential Success in the Realm of Foreign Affairs: 
Institutional Reform and the Role of House Committees.” Social Science Quarterly 
84(3): 685-703. 
 
McCormick, James M. (2005). American Foreign Policy and Process, 4th Edition. 
Belmont, CA: Thomson-Wadsworth. 
 
Meernik, James. (1993). “Presidential Support in Congress: Conflict and Consensus on 
Foreign and Defense Policy.” Journal of Politics 55(3): 569-88. 
 
Miller, Ross A. (1995). “Domestic Structures and the Diversionary Use of Force.” 
American Journal of Political Science 39(3): 760-785. 
 
Mitchell, Neil J. (1997). The Conspicuous Corporation: Business, Public Policy, and 
Representative Democracy. Michigan. 
 69 
 
Moens, Alexander. (2004). The Foreign Policy of George W. Bush. Cornwall, UK: 
Ashgate. 
 
Morgan, T. Clifton, and Kenneth N. Bickers. (1992). “Domestic Discontent and the 
External Use of Force.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36: 25-52. 
 
Neustadt, Richard E. (1990). Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics 
of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Nincic, Miroslav. (2004). “Elections and U.S. Foreign Policy.” In The Domestic Sources 
of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, 4th Edition, ed. Eugene R. 
Wittkopf and James M. McCormick. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Olson, William C. (1976). “President, Congress and American Foreign Policy: 
Confrontation or Collaboration.” International Affairs 52(4): 565-582. 
 
O’Neil, Kate, Jorg Balsiger, and VanDeveer, Stacy D. (2004). “Actors, Norms, and 
Impact: Recent International Cooperation Theory and the Influence of the Agent-
Structure Debate.” Annual Review of Political Science 7(1): 149-75. 
 
Ostrom, Charles W. and Brian L. Job. (1986). “The President and the Political Use of 
Force.” The American Political Science Review 80(2): 541-566. 
 
Page, Benjamin I., and Jason Barabas. (2000). “Foreign Policy Gaps Between Citizens 
and Leaders.” International Studies Quarterly 44: 339-364. 
 
Reagan, Ronald. “Remarks and Speeches.” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 
National Archives and Records Administration. Accessed February 1, 2005.  
Available: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/rrpubpap.asp 
 
Risse-Kappan, Thomas. (1991). “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy 
in Liberal Democracies.” World Politics 43(4): 479-512. 
 
Robison, Sam. (N.d). “George W. Bush and the Vulcans: Leader-Advisor Relations and 
America’s Response to the 9/11 Attacks.” In Beliefs and Leadership in World 
Politics, ed. Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker. New York: Palgrave Press. 
Forthcoming. 
 
Rosati, Jerel. (2002). “Studying Images and Their Impact on Behavior: The Case of the 
Carter Administration.” From Political Leadership for the New Century, ed. Linda 
O. Valenty and Ofer Feldman. Westport, CT: Praeger. 
 




Scanlon, Gregory M. (1992). “Hard Choices: American Oil Import Dependence and Oil 
Import Fees.” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 24(1): 115-40. 
 
Schafer, Mark. (2000). “Issues in Assessing Psychological Characteristics at a Distance: 
An Introduction to the Symposium.” Political Psychology 21(3): 511-527. 
 
Schafer, Mark and Scott Crichlow. (2000). “Bill Clinton’s Operational Code: Assessing 
Source Material Bias.” Political Psychology 21(3): 559-71. 
 
Schelling, Thomas C. (1960). Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Scott, Bennett D. and Allan Stam. (2000). “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual.” 
International Interactions 26: 179-204. 
 
Sobel, Richard. (2001). The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since 
Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Snyder, Glenn and Paul A. Diesing. (1977). Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, 
Decision-Making, and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
“Spot Oil Prices: West Texas Intermediate.”  Economic Research: Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis. Accessed 2005, May 11. Available: 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/OILPRICE/98 
 
Walker, Stephen G. and Mark Schafer. (2000a). “The Operational Codes of Bill Clinton 
and Tony Blair: Beliefs Systems or Schemata?” Paper presented at the 2000 meeting 
of the American Political Science Association, August 31-September 3, Washington, 
D.C. 
 
Walker, Stephen G. and Mark Schafer. (2000b). “The Political Universe of Lyndon B. 
Johnson and His Advisors: Diagnostic and Strategic Propensities in Their 
Operational Codes.” Political Psychology 21(3): 529-43. 
 
Walker, Stephen G., Mark Schafer and Michael D. Young. (1997). “Presidential 
Operational Codes and Foreign Policy Conflicts in the Post-Cold War World.” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 43(5):610-25. 
 
Walker, Stephen G., Mark Schafer and Michael D. Young. (1998). “Systematic 
Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter’s 
Operational Code.” International Studies Quarterly 42: 175-190. 
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. (1974). “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist.” 
Comparative Studies in Society & History, 16(4): 387-415. 
 
 71 
Walt, Stephen. (1987). The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Waltz, Kenneth. (1979). Theory of International Politics. MA: Addison-Wesley. 
 
Winter, D. G. (2003). “Assessing Leaders’ Personalities: A Historical Survey of 
Academic Research Studies.” In The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders 
with Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton, ed. Jerrold Post. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
 
Winter, D. G. (2005). “Things I’ve Learned About Personality From Studying Political 
Leaders at a Distance.” Journal of Personality 73(3): 557-584. 
 
Wittkopf, Eugene and James M. McCormick. (1990). “Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and 
Ideology in Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947-1988.” Journal 
of Politics 52(November): 1077-1100. 
 
Wittkopf, Eugene and James M. McCormick. (1998). “Congress, the President, and the 
End of the Cold War: Has Anything Changed?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
42(August): 440-466. 
 
Woodward, Bob. (2004). Plan of Attack . New York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Young, Michael D. (2001), "Building WorldViews with Profiler+." In Applications of 
Computer Content Analysis. Edited by Mark D. West. Progress in Communication 




Sam Robison was born in Atmore, Alabama, and lived most of his life in Crown 
Point, Louisiana.  In 2002, he graduated from the University of Southern Mississippi in 
Hattiesburg, where he received a Bachelor of Science degree in psychology.  In the fall of 
2003, Sam began his studies in the Department of Political Science at Louisiana State 
University in Baton Rouge. 
